Chiara Ferella

Waking up Sleeping Metaphors: A Cognitive Approach to Parmenides' Two Ways of Enquiry

Communicated by Markus Asper

Received September 9, 2016
Revised April 12, 2017
Accepted May 9, 2017
Published August 8, 2017

Edited by Gerd Graßhoff and Michael Meyer, Excellence Cluster Topoi, Berlin

eTopoi ISSN 2192-2608
http://journal.topoi.org

Except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
This paper discusses the notions of sleeping and waking metaphors, activation of metaphoricity and deliberate metaphor use in the poem of Parmenides of Elea. I analyse certain metaphors in Parmenides' text, which I understand as linguistic realizations of the conceptual metaphor 'AN ARGUMENT DEFINES A PATH.' I show that these are sleeping metaphors, and that Parmenides woke them up at the outset of his philosophical discourse. By identifying rhetorical devices which indicate Parmenides' deliberateness when activating sleeping metaphors, I show to what extent and to what goals deliberate metaphors are powerful tools in Parmenides' philosophical discourse.

This paper is a revised and expanded version of the paper I presented at the Topoi-Workshop "Metaphors and Other Ways We Choose By. A Workshop in the Study of Metaphors in Ancient and Medieval Texts", on 6-7 November 2015 at the Topoi Excellence Cluster in Berlin. I would like to thank all the organizers of the conference and the participants for their comments and suggestions. Many thanks, above all, to Camilla Di Biase-Dyson and to Prof Gerard Steen for their precious comments and advice on an earlier draft of this paper. Finally, many thanks to the two anonymous referees for their helpful suggestions.
conceptual metaphor an argument defines a path. This paper shall analyse those linguistic expressions, in Parmenides’ poem, which come from the more concrete conceptual domain of “paths” in order to determine to what extent and to what goals Parmenides talked about arguments (and methods) of enquiry in terms of paths, referred to those who wish to know in terms of travellers, and hinted at results of enquiry in terms of destinations. In this framework it will be shown that, at Parmenides’ time, linguistic realizations of the conceptual metaphor an argument defines a path were entrenched metaphors, namely metaphors whose level of conventionalization might have impeded an average Greek language user of that time to grasping their figurative value in its entirety. However, these metaphors, though conventional, were transparent, which means that their metaphorically, albeit at a lower degree, was still present and could have been perceived by language users. These kinds of metaphors are regarded as sleeping, according to Cornelia Müller’s definition and this paper will analyse in which way and to what extent Parmenides aimed to wake them up. Moreover, this paper aims to identify those rhetorical devices, in Parmenides’ text, which might point to Parmenides’ deliberateness when waking up sleeping metaphors. Thus, it will be shown that deliberate use of metaphors related to arguments-paths by Parmenides has, within his philosophical discourse, a paraenetic scope: Parmenides might have wished to compare his philosophy to a path of truth and even of salvation, thereby dramatizing the option of choosing his philosophy as it were a choice of life or death.

2 Conceptual Metaphor Theory

Following E. Semino, I define metaphor as “the phenomenon whereby we talk, and potentially think, about something in terms of something else.” The adjective “conceptual” points to a metaphor theory that has become the prevalent paradigm in metaphor studies: the Conceptual Metaphor theory or CMT. As we now know it, CMT was developed by G. Lakoff and his colleagues in the 1980s and has been developed and refined since then. By charging the traditional view envisaging metaphors as a matter of language and words

1 The use of small capital letters is a common feature, within the studies of metaphor theories, to indicate that “the particular wording does not occur in language as such, but it underlies conceptually all the metaphorical expressions listed underneath it” (Kövecses 2002, 4). In the chapter 16 of their 1980 book, Lakoff and Johnson discuss as an example the conceptual metaphor argument is a path, which, combined with the notion that a journey defines a path renders an argument defines a path. By the word ‘argument’ I mean what the Oxford Dictionary defines as “set of reasons given in support of an idea, action or theory”. Note that, as is shown in the main body of this paper, the conceptual metaphor argument defines a path can often be rephrased, in Parmenides, as a method defines a path. All these conceptual metaphors are related to the broader conceptual metaphor enquiry is a journey, which is very pertinent to Parmenides' texts under discussion. As a matter of fact, we are dealing with a metaphorical scenario: Parmenides (or any human being who wishes to know) is a traveller on a journey with his enquiry-goals seen as destinations to be reached. Parmenides’ philosophy could be seen as the vehicle that enables people to pursue those goals. The journey is not easy. First of all, there are different paths one can choose. These paths represent ways of enquiry, hence methods of enquiry and arguments resulting from them. There are places (crossroads) where a decision has to been made about which roads and directions to go in. Thus, as we can see, this metaphorical scenario involves understanding one domain of experience, enquiry, in terms of a very different domain of experience, journey.

2 Kövecses 2002, 4 points out that “we thus need to distinguish conceptual metaphor from metaphorical linguistic expressions. The latter are words or any linguistic expressions that come from the language or terminology of the more concrete conceptual domain (i.e. domain B)”.


4 Steen 2008, 22.

5 Semino 2008, 1.

alone, this theory argues that metaphors are mainly matter of thought and work in our conceptual upbringing. Despite being a mere artistic or esthetic device, metaphors work in understanding concepts, and are inevitable processes of human thought and reasoning, which are pervasively used in everyday life. CMT defines metaphors as sets of systematic ‘mappings’ across conceptual domains:

A convenient shorthand way of capturing this view of metaphor is the following: conceptual domain (a) is conceptual domain (b), which is what is called conceptual metaphor. A conceptual metaphor consists of two conceptual domains in which one domain is understood in terms of another. A conceptual domain is any coherent organization of experience. […] The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called the source domain, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the target domain.\(^7\)

A concrete example may help understand this idea. Saying that I cannot follow the argument you are presenting, because in presenting it you are going around in circles, and I am ultimately feeling lost, means relying on the conceptual domain of (going along) paths to understand the conceptual domain of arguments. Accordingly, this means that we have coherently organized knowledge about paths that we rely on in understanding arguments. As Kövecses points out:\(^8\)

We thus need to distinguish conceptual metaphor from metaphorical linguistic expressions. The latter are words or any linguistic expressions that come from the language or terminology of the more concrete conceptual domain (i.e. domain B) … The conceptual domain from which we draw metaphorical expressions to understand another conceptual domain is called the source domain, while the conceptual domain that is understood this way is the target domain.

Finally, conceptual metaphors typically employ a more abstract concept as target and a more concrete or physical concept as their source, as it is also the case for the conceptual metaphor under analysis in this paper. In doing so, conceptual metaphors are always found to abide by the so-called principle of unidirectionality which states that the metaphorical process typically goes from the more concrete to the more abstract, and not the other way around.

Accordingly, the conceptual metaphor under discussion, an argument defines a path, entails that our understanding of ‘arguments’ (target domain) rests upon our coherently organized knowledge about ‘paths’ (source domain). Thus, this paper shall analyse those linguistic expressions, in Parmenides’ poem, which come from the source domain of ‘paths’, to determine to what extent and to what goals Parmenides talked about arguments of enquiry in terms of paths, referred to those who wish to know in terms of travellers, and hinted at results of enquiry in terms of destinations. Moreover, we will see that, in the texts of Parmenides, the metaphorical process always goes from path to argument, from travellers to enquirer (that is, people who wish to know) and from destinations to results of an enquiry.

\(^7\) Kövecses\(^2002\) 4.
\(^8\) Kövecses\(^2002\) 4.
3 Sleeping and waking metaphors

In 2008 Cornelia Müller, by challenging the traditional dichotomy between ‘dead’ and ‘alive’ metaphors,\(^9\) argues that conventional verbal metaphors can be “dead and alive”, and that their metaphoricity, subsequently, can be empirically documented.\(^10\) Substantially, Müller challenges the view that processes of conventionalization of metaphors lead automatically and immediately to a loss of metaphoricity. In contrast, she demonstrates that there are “conventionalized verbal metaphors” which “may be active for a given speaker/writer at a given moment in time and may be not active for another speaker/writer at another moment of time.”\(^11\) Thus, Müller is able to show that there is a sub-group of so-called dead metaphors that are not dead at all, since their metaphoricity can be activated at any moment by any language user. Therefore, she introduces the distinction between opaque and transparent ‘dead’ metaphors,\(^12\) and maintains that, whereas opaque metaphors are so conventional that their metaphoricity is not perceived anymore, and can only be disclosed by etymology,\(^13\) those conventionalized metaphors whose metaphoricity is still perceived, albeit at a lower degree, are to be considered as transparent.\(^14\) As a result, Müller suggested a twofold distinction to classify metaphors. On the one hand, we have a tripartite schema that distinguishes historical,\(^15\) entrenched and novel metaphors, and that rests upon the criteria of conventionalization, novelty and transparency. Thus, historical metaphors are highly conventionalized and opaque, entrenched metaphors are conventionalized and transparent, and novel metaphors are not conventionalized and transparent.\(^16\) The second schema rests upon the criterion of activation\(^17\) of metaphoricity at the moment when the language user is speaking or writing (i.e. in language use). Since, as we have seen above, activation of metaphoricity is only possible when there is transparency, the second classification only applies to metaphors that are transparent (that is, entrenched and novel metaphors). These are distinguished into sleeping and waking metaphors: sleeping metaphors present a low (or a lower) degree of activation of metaphoricity, while waking metaphors present a high (or a higher) degree of activation of metaphoricity.\(^18\)

---

\(^9\) Traditionally, dead metaphors are all conventional metaphoric or idiomatic expressions, whose metaphoricity is no longer aware and have ceased, therefore, to be metaphors at all. Examples of ‘dead’ metaphors are both words like ‘comprehend’ and expressions like ‘falling in love’, which are hardly perceived as metaphors by an average Anglophone. Alive metaphors, in contrast, are usually novel and poetic metaphors, like the terms theater, actors and stage in the sentence “Life is a theater and we are just actors on its stage” or the word Tsunami in “you are a Tsunami of ideas”. Although the dichotomy between dead and alive metaphors is so pervasive in metaphor studies that Black\(^{25}\) defined it “a trite opposition”, CMT worked out the reverse and provoking conclusion that conventionalized metaphors are, from a cognitive perspective, the most alive. In fact, like grammatical and phonological rules, conventional metaphors are constantly and automatically in use, and this makes them particularly alive, Lakoff\(^{245}\).

\(^10\) Müller\(^\text{2008}\), esp. 1–8 and 178–209.

\(^11\) Müller\(^\text{2008}\), 2.

\(^12\) Müller\(^\text{2008}\), 183. This distinction is not new (see Müller’s references at p. 183), and parallels what Lakoff and Turner have labelled as historical and conventional metaphors.

\(^13\) As in the example at n. 9 above: the metaphorical nature of the English verb “comprehend” is extinguished and can only be disclosed by etymology.

\(^14\) Müller\(^\text{2008}\), 11.

\(^15\) “Historical” is the word employed by Lakoff and Turner, while Müller calls them “dead”.

\(^16\) See Müller\(^\text{2008}\), 11.

\(^17\) My use of the term ‘activation’, despite following Müller’s terminology, does not indicate any cognitive process on the side either of the receiver or of the producer. By the notion of “activation of metaphoricity” I mean hereafter a communicative strategy (which, in the case of Parmenides, is a textual strategy) that, by the use of certain devices (linguistic and poetic devices in the case of Parmenides), signals the presence of, and thereby draws attention to, metaphors.

\(^18\) Müller\(^\text{2008}\), 11.
To sum up, Müller works out two main conclusions from her analysis:

1) metaphoricity is dynamic: if entrenched metaphors may potentially be activated during language use, they must not be taken as dead metaphors, but rather as either sleeping (when showing a low or no degree of metaphoricity) or waking (when showing a high degree of activation).

2) metaphoricity has a gradable nature, that means that it could be activated at a higher or a lower degree by its producer.

4 Deliberate metaphor use

Activation of metaphoricity (at a lower or higher degree) by a language user at a certain time points to Gerard Steen’s notion of deliberate metaphor use. Although it is not new, this notion has been receiving more and more attention in recent time. Gerard J. Steen is the pioneer of this promising field of research, and he defines deliberate metaphors as follows:

A metaphor is used deliberately when it is expressly meant to change the addressee’s perspective on the referent or topic that is the target of the metaphor, by making the addressee look at it from a different conceptual domain or space, which functions as a conceptual source.

Steen argues that the distinction between deliberate and non-deliberate metaphor use rests upon what he called the communicative dimension of metaphor. He subsequently suggests a three-dimensional model of metaphor, and classifies metaphors not only according to linguistic (direct vs indirect metaphors) and conceptual parameters (novel vs conventional metaphors), but also according to a communicative dimension (deliberate vs non-deliberate metaphors). More recently Steen has refined his theory by highlighting two essential features in deliberate metaphor use: intention and attention. He points out that (1) deliberate metaphor gets represented as metaphor in the situation model or textbase, that is with distinct attention to the source domain as a separate referential aspect of the meaning of the utterance. (2) Deliberate metaphors require online cross-domain mapping, involving attention to the source domain as a conceptual and referential domain in its own right. (3) Deliberate metaphor can be experienced as a metaphor by ordinary language users because of the attention to the source domain in the textbase. (4) In deliberate metaphor, metaphor acquires a communicative function as metaphor between language users.

However, how can we determine if a certain metaphor is used deliberately by a given language user at a given time? One of the clearest feature indicating deliberate metaphor use is a lexical signal, such as the word ‘like’ in a simile. In other terms, in the expression “Martha sings like a nightingale”, the word ‘like’ is meant to indicate a direct comparison (or an explicit cross-domain mapping) between Martha and the nightingale. Expressions of these kinds are defined as direct metaphors, and leave, as Steen has pointed out, “the addressee no option but to pay explicit attention to the source domain as a source domain. Direct metaphor is deliberately metaphorical.” Beside direct metaphors, the creation of
novel metaphors might also be a clear feature to determine deliberate metaphor use. Nevertheless, while direct and novel metaphors are typical examples of deliberate metaphors, Steen argues that people can also use conventional and indirect metaphor in highly deliberate ways. However, in the case of conventional and indirect metaphors, the question of how to determine if they are deliberate raises a further question concerning the identification of specific devices that might point to deliberateness.

This brings us back to Müller’s notion of activation of metaphoricity, and leads us to risk the assumption that a given degree of active metaphoricity might point to deliberate metaphor use. To put it another way: when I am able to determine that a language user has activated metaphoricity of a given conventional and indirect metaphor, I can conclude, as a result, that the language user is deliberately using metaphors. Therefore, an awake metaphor might be a good candidate as a deliberate metaphor.

Müller convincingly argues that metaphoricity is not a property of lexeme, as traditionally believed, but rather a matter of individual activation. Therefore, it pertains to the context in which the metaphor is produced. As Müller highlights, “we may methodologically exploit the context and use it as a window onto the cognitive processes underlying metaphor production.” Müller argues that there are concrete contextual devices that indicate activation of metaphoricity. Since, as we saw above, activation of metaphoricity is likely to point to deliberateness, the same devices that indicate activation and degree of metaphoricity might point to deliberate metaphor use.

This considered, the proximity of the language user to the context in which the language is produced seems to be a significant element to establish degrees of metaphoricity and degrees of deliberateness in the metaphors in language use. The central question of this paper is, therefore, whether and to what extent we can trace out deliberate metaphor use when this proximity lacks, as in the case of ancient texts. And, above all, when dealing with ancient texts, can we trace out concrete textual elements that might attest to a higher or lower activation of metaphoricity and, accordingly, to deliberate metaphor use?

5 Ancient metaphors of Lied-Weg: low degree of metaphoricity

At the outset of his philosophical discourse, Parmenides introduces the topics he is going to deal with by means of a metaphor. He asserts that there are two ways (hodoi) of enquiry (dizēsios), “the one, that (it) is and that (it) is not not to be”, and “the other, that (it) is not and that (it) must not be”. These two ways are described elsewhere by the synonymous terms keleuthos, “path” and atarpos, “trail.” The idea of “ways of enquiry” calls back to mind the “ways of songs” of the epic bards or Herodotus’ “ways of discourses” or “ways of stories”. These were traditional metaphors to refer to ways, namely modes or versions, of poetic compositions, of the storytelling, or of any verbal composition in general (i.e. to

27 In my attempt to search for an answer, I must say that I found Kyriazis’s proposal of verbal activation devices immensely useful. These devices are listed by Müller 2008, 190–191. I shall refer to some of them more in detail when relevant for Parmenides’ text.
28 DK 28 B 2.2. Parmenides’ fragments are quoted according to the edition by Palmer 2009, which I also adopt for their English translation. This fragment in particular is quoted in its entirety below.
29 What, exactly, do these two paths of enquiry correspond to? This is a debated question in the studies of Parmenides. Scholars have attempted, over the years, to relate the paths of enquiry to the parts of Parmenides’ philosophy. In this framework, some scholars proposed that the paths are not two but three. Since a thorough analysis of this issue is not directly pertinent to the main topic of this paper, and would inevitably lead us too far afield, here I will limit myself to referring to the extensive discussion of this issue in Palmer 2009, 61–105.
30 See below.
the talking/writing about a theme or a stories). Hereafter it will be shown that ancient Greek terminology depicts the act of composing a song or of storytelling in terms of going along paths, the results of this composing in terms of destinations, and the poet who is composing in terms of a traveller.

We already find elements that hint at this metaphor domain in the Homeric poems. For example, in Od. 8.73 the Muse is said to have induced (anēke) the singer at Alcinous’ court, Demodocus, to sing the glory of the heroes from a specific theme (oimē). The verb anīemi in this context could be an entrenched or even a historical metaphor (just like the English verb “to induce” that translates it), whose primary meaning is that of a verb of motion related to the sphere of going along a path to come up to or reach a spatial point. Furthermore, in the Homeric Hymn to Hermes 451 the Muses talk of an oimos aoidēs, “the path or course of song.” The same idea is in Hesiod’s Works and Days 639 where the Muses are told to have led (epibēsan) Hesiod along the path of melodious song. This can be put in relation to Pindar O. 9.47 epeōn oimon ligun. As O. Becker highlighted,

[...] wenn also die Vorstellung des Gehens im Liede belegt ist und andererseits das Lied hier mit dem anklingenden Wort oimos bezeichnet wird, so besteht zum mindesten große Wahrscheinlichkeit dafür, daß oimē mit oimos verwandt ist und ursprünglich auch eine Wegvorstellung in sich enthält.

Becker analyses the development of this traditional motif of Lied-Weg both in the lyric poet Pindar (first half of the 5th century BCE), in Herodotus (second half of the 5th century BCE) and in the tragic poets Aeschylus (first half of the 5th century BCE) and Sophocles (second half of the 5th century BCE). From this analysis, Becker works out that the metaphor of Lied-Weg did not have its origin in poetry, but rather developed from spoken language, and became, already in Homer, a conventionalized way of referring to poetical composition, to storytelling or, more simply, to talking/writing about something in general. Thus, we can define such a metaphor as an entrenched one.

As a matter of fact, Herodotus’ prose, for example, seems to demonstrate that referring to the presentation of a given theme or to the storytelling in terms of going along paths is conventional at his time, while the metaphors of paths to refer to topics of a story, or to arguments more likely, seem to be sleeping ones. This is shown by the fact that, in many passages of Herodotus’ works, we repeatedly find expressions like ἑρχομαι φράσων, λέξων, ἐρέων, ἀνείμι, ἀναβαίνω, ἐπάνειμι, ἐπὶ τὸν πρότερον λόγον, etc. (“approach”, “come back”, “return”, or “recapitulate a previous discourse”). An analogous conclusion can be worked out from other Herodotean passages that involve the metaphorical use of the word hodos (often in expressions of the kind of hodos logōn) referring both to topics of stories, of discourses or of arguments, and to different versions of the same story. Thus, we can draw a twofold conclusion: 1) kinds of topics/arguments-path-metaphors like those we find in Herodotus, since they are entrenched and sleeping, display a low degree of metaphoricity. 2) This low degree...
of metaphoricity indicates that entrenched metaphors are unlikely to display a deliber-erate metaphor use, unless we can find verbal devices that indicate activation of their metaphoricity.

This is the case of Pindar, who shows a rather different tendency when dealing with the same metaphor cluster. As Becker has thoroughly demonstrated, Pindar’s poetry is able, in fact, to inflect conventional metaphors related to Lied-Weg into several novel motifs and images.\(^{39}\) These are all produced from the same conceptual domain that labels the poetic song in terms of a path on which the poet, when composing, goes.\(^{40}\) The many inflections that this motif has received by Pindar clearly show that these kinds of metaphors, though conventionalized, are transparent, and could be therefore activated by a given writer at any given moment in time.

6 Parmenides’ ways of enquiry: activation of metaphoricity

DK 28 B 2:

εἰ δὲ ἄγ’ ἐγών ἔρεω, κόμισαι δὲ σὺ μόθον ἄκούσας,
ἀξίνερ ὁδοὶ μοῦναι διζήσιος εἰσι νοῆσαι.

ἡ μὲν ὅπως ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς οὐκ ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
πειθοῦς ἐστι κέλευθος, ἀληθείη γὰρ ὁπηδεῖ,

ἡ δ’ ὡς οὐκ ἔστιν τε καὶ ὡς χρεών ἔστι μὴ εἶναι,
τὴν δὴ τοι φράζω παναπευθέα ἔμμεν ἀταρπόν,
οὔτε γὰρ ἄν γνοίης τὸ γε μὴ ἐὸν (ο.writelned γὰρ ἄνυστόν)
οὔτε φράσαις.

Come now, I shall tell – and convey home the tale once you have heard – just which ways of enquiry alone there are for understanding:

the one, that (it) is and that (it) is not not to be,

is the path of conviction, for it goes with true reality,

but the other, that (it) is not and that (it) must not be this, I tell you, is a trail wholly without report

for neither could you apprehend what is not, for it is not to be accomplished,

nor could you indicate it.\(^{41}\)

In the verses above, I italicise those terms that could be verbal realisations of the conceptual metaphor \textit{an argument defines a path}. As can be seen, words relating to the same metaphor cluster are repeated four times within eight lines: we have \textit{ways (hodoi)} at l.2, \textit{path (keleuthos)} and \textit{goes with (opēdei)} at l.4 as well as \textit{trail (atarpon)} at l.6. Note that not only does Parmenides compare arguments (or methods) of enquiry to paths, but conviction about certain themes is said to \textit{go together} with reality, suggesting the idea that developing convincing and true arguments might be understood as going along paths. This clustering of metaphors from the same conceptual domain might be taken as a device activating

---

40 See Becker 1937, 68–82, for a thorough analysis of Pindar’s passages and further bibliography.
41 Transl. Palmer 2009, slightly modified.
metaphoricity. As a matter of fact, it is mentioned among the activation devices listed by Kyratzis,42 and labelled as “composing.”43

The suggestion that we deal here with an activation device gains force if we consider the fact that, in the original layout of Parmenides’ poem, the verses of B 2 were closely followed by the verses of B 6:

χρὴ τὸ λέγειν τε νοεῖν τ’ ἐὸν ἔμμεναι· ἐστὶ γὰρ εἶναι, μηδὲν θ’ οὐκ ἔστιν· τά σ’ ἐγὼ φράζονταί άνωγα. πρώτης γάρ σ’ ᾧφ’ ὁδοὺ ταύτης διζήσιος <ἄρξω>, αὐτάρ ἐπειτ’ ἀπό τής, ἢ δὴ βροτοί εἰδότες οὐδὲν πλάζονται, δίκρανοι· διήμηναν γὰρ ἐν αὐτῶν
στήθεσιν ἰθὺνει πλακτὸν νόον· οἱ δὲ φορεῖνται κωφοὶ ὁμὼς τυφλοὶ τε, τεθηπότες, ἄκριτα φῦλα, οἷς τὸ πέλειν τε καὶ οὐκ εἶναι τωὐτὸν νενόμισται κοὐ τωὐτόν, πάντων δὲ παλίντροπός ἐστι κέλευθος.

It is necessary to say and think that what is is; for it is to be, but nothing is not. These things I bid you ponder.

For <I shall begin> for you from this first way of inquiry, then yet again from that which mortals who know nothing wander two-headed: for haplessness in their breasts directs their wandering mind. They are borne along deaf and blind at once, bedazzled, undiscriminating hordes, who have supposed that it is and is not the same and not the same; but the path of all these turns back on itself.44

Here words relating to the metaphor cluster we are analysing are seven within nine verses. The composing of metaphors from the same source domain is striking; besides the familiar mapping between arguments (or methods) of enquiry and paths, Parmenides verbalizes the conceptually related idea according to which the one who wishes to enquire is understood in terms of a traveller. In these verses in particular, the focus is on human beings who, since they know nothing, at l.5 are said to wander around (plattontai). At l.6 we find out that helplessness (amēchaniē) directs (ithunei) the movement of their mind (plakton noon). Thus, they are borne (phorountai) along a wrong path that turns back on itself (palintropos esti keleuthos).

42 Kyratzis 2003; see Müller 2008, 190.
43 “Composing: Kyratzis distinguishes two different ways of composing: one is the clustering of metaphors from the same source domain, and the other is a metaphorical-literal juxtaposition. Here are the examples: 1. Clustering of source domain expressions: “Mr President, ladies and gentlemen Members of Parliament, I am certain that tonight’s discussion unites the Greek people against a new common enemy, namely the dangerous invasion of drugs in the Greek society, an enemy that threatens today every advanced society and one that no society has managed to defeat no matter how many weapons it has used”; 2. Metaphorical-literal juxtaposition as in “Education, along with our army, is our national defense.” Müller 2008, 190.
In addition to the activation device that we called “composing”, we find in these verses another device that is likely to point to active metaphor use. The verb *plattontai* and the adjective *plakton* are words deriving from the same semantic root. However, the adjective is not only more unusual than the verb, but its use as attribute of the mind is perceived as infrequent and odd -not to say unnatural. The closeness of two etymologically related words, on the one hand, and the estranging wording *plakton noon*, on the other, could be taken as devices that activate metaphoricity. Moreover, it is worth noting that the unusual characterization of men as “two-headed” (*dikranoi* B 6. 5) could refer back to the two ways of enquiry that the goddess has described in B 2. In particular, “two-headed” could hint at the fact that human beings mix the two ways of enquiry in their attempts to know. Since they suppose, as we read few lines below, “that it is and is not the same and not the same” (B 6.8-9), it is as if they had one head to think that it is and a second hand to think that it is not. But ways of enquiry were already depicted as mutually exclusive in B 2.3-6 (“the one, that (it) is and that (it) is not not to be” and “the other, that (it) is not and that (it) must not be”). In contrast, the fact that ordinary human beings mix the two ways of enquiry is the distinctive mark of their congenital ignorance (they “know nothing, *eidotesouden* at l.4). Therefore, the unusual adjective *dikranoi* describing human beings is likely to hint at human attempts to knowledge, and to point indirectly to the two ways of enquiry. Consequently, it could be seen as another device activating metaphoricity within the cluster of arguments-paths. Note that the depiction of ignorant mortals ends with a last glimpse on the path they go in: it is a path without a proper destination, since it returns to the starting point (*palintropos* at l.9). This element introduces the notion that ordinary processes of reasoning are completely unsuccessful and even futile, not providing any understanding.

Furthermore, if we take B 2 and B 6 together, we might recognize a further activation device, connected to the repetition of the same metaphor term:45 thus, whereas *hodou* at 6.3 recalls *hodoi* at 2.2, *keleuthos* in 6.9 parallels *keleuthos* in 2.4. Let us, furthermore, extend this analysis to B 7 and B 8.1–2, which might have closely followed B 6:

(7) οὐ γὰρ μήποτε τοῦτο δαμῇ εἶναι μὴ ἔοντα-άλλα οὐ τῆσδ' ἀφ' ὁδοῦ διζήσιος εἴρην νόημα
μηδὲ σ' ἔθος πολύπειρον ὅδον κατὰ τήνδε βιάσθω,
νωμᾶν ἄσκοπον δήμα καὶ ἤχεσσαν ἀκουὴν
καὶ γλῶσσαν, κρίνατε δὲ λόγωι πολύδηριν ἔλεγχον
έξ ἐμέθεν ῥηθέντα

(8) μόνος δ' ἔτι μῦθος ὁδοῖο
λείπεται ώς ἔστιν.

For this may never be made manageable, that things that are not are.
But you from this *way of enquiry* restrain your understanding,
and do not let habit born of much experience force you along this *way*,
to employ aimless sight and echoing hearing
and tongue. But judge by reason the strife-filled critique

45 Repetition of the same metaphor term is taken as an activation device by Kyratzis [2003], see Müller [2008], 191. Repetition is different from clustering in that the former entails the reiteration of the same term, while the latter implies the recurrence of different terms from the same domain.
I have delivered.
And yet a single tale of a way
remains. …

The repetition of the same metaphor word here is amazing: the term *hodos* (in different cases) is repeated thrice within seven verses. Note moreover Parmenides’ play on words in 8.1: the common metaphorical wording *hodos mythou* meaning “path of a story”, which was regularly used in Parmenides’ time and, as we have seen, probably not any more perceived as a metaphor by average language users, becomes here *mythos* *hodou*, “story” or “account of a path”. This unusual rephrasing of a common wording might have had an estranging effect on the audience, and might therefore represent another device activating metaphoricity.

7 A powerful activation device: evoking images

I hope to have shown, through the analysis of the verses in which metaphors relating to the conceptual domain *an argument defines a path* are verbally and poetically realized, which verbal devices Parmenides used in order to activate metaphoricity in a conventionalized metaphor cluster. From this *usus*, we might infer that Parmenides deliberately aimed to wake up sleeping metaphors belonging to that cluster for specific purposes. However, before attempting to identify such purposes, it is necessary to deal with another, powerful – as it will turn out to be – contextual device that is employed by Parmenides, and which activates metaphoricity to a high degree: the evoking, in the audiences’ mind, of images or scenes that appear to be related to the metaphorical domain of arguments – paths. Specifically, the image or scene Parmenides is able to evoke is that of an extraordinary journey, which Parmenides recounted in the prologue to his philosophical poem, an experience in which he got personally involved. This experience is intended to be understood in non-metaphorical terms, but is in fact modelled through literary echoes and parallels from the tradition of epic poetry, parallels which are meant to evoke in the audience’s mind those epic scenes from which Parmenides’ echoes and parallels come from. In fact, by borrowing a word from the epic tradition, Parmenides could immediately call to mind the word’s context and, by using two or three words together which also occurred together in the epic tradition, he could evoke a whole epic scene.⁴⁶

Concerning the specific topic of this paper, it is worth noting that the first reference to *hodos* by Parmenides is not in the sense of “paths of enquiry” in the verses of B 2, but *hodos* is one of the first words of his poem altogether. In fact, we find it twice at the very outset of the prologue to Parmenides’ philosophical discourse. At B 1.1–5 we read:

> ἵπποι ταί με φέρουσιν, ὄσον τ’ ἐπὶ θυμὸς ἱκάνοι,  
> πέμπου, ἐπεὶ μ’ ἑκόν ἐκόμον ἀγουσαι  
> δαίμονος, ἢ κατὰ τιμῶντ’ ἄτηφέρει εἰδότα φῶτα·  
> τῇ φερόμην. τῇ γάρ με πολύφραστοι φέρον ἵπποι  
> ἁρμα τιταίνουσαι, κοῦραι δ’ ὅδου ἤγεμόνευουν.  

The mares who carry me as far as the soul could reach

⁴⁶ This point was made by Kingsley [1995, 42–43], with regard to Empedocles, but it perfectly applies to Parmenides too.
Chiara Ferella

were leading the way, once they stepped guiding me upon the path of many songs of the divinity, which carries over all cities the man who knows.

On it was I borne, for on it were the headstrong mares carrying me, drawing the chariot along, and maidens were leading the way.

It is not unlikely that Parmenides’ audience, when hearing for the first time of the two hodoi of enquiry (B 2.2; see above), were immediately led to link them to the bodos of many songs they heard in the prologue (B 1.2–3). This hypothesis gains force if we consider the fact that, within the lines of B 6 which, as we have seen, might closely have followed the verses of B 2, there are verbatim parallels with the first lines of Parmenides’ prologue. In particular, the description of ordinary people in B 6 plays on contrast with Parmenides’ self-representation in the very beginning of his poem. As we have seen above, in B 6 we are told that mortals know nothing (B 6.4: brotai eidotes ouden), while Parmenides is here depicted as a man who knows (eidōs phōs in B 1.3). Moreover, mortals “wander along” (plattontai B 6.5), and have a wandering understanding (plankton noon B 6.6), because they are borne along (pherousin B 1.1) Parmenides along a divine path that leads (pherei B 1.3) to a precise destination, while the path of mortals “turns back on itself” (palintropos esti keleuthos B 6.9).

These are reasons to conclude that, when hearing of the two ways of enquiry in B 2 and of the depiction of wandering people in B 6, Parmenides’ audience might have called to mind the whole scene of Parmenides’ journey on the divine path of many songs depicted in the prologue.

Parmenides’ prologue, quoted in its entirety by Sextus, is the account of Parmenides’ exceptional journey to the house of Night, in order to meet a goddess who is presented as the source of Parmenides’ philosophy. Parmenides depicts himself carried along the route of the Sun on a chariot driven by mares, while the Daughters of the Sun indicate the direction that leads him to an extraordinary place (ll. 11–18):

There are the gates of the paths of Night and Day.

---

49 That the hodos daimonos (ll.2–3) corresponds to the route of Helios has been suggested by Cornford 1952, 118 n.1, Burkert 1969, 7, and, recently, by Palmer 2009, 56, and Cosgrove 2011, 32. However, δοιμονος can also mean “the route of the goddess”, with reference to the goddess whom Parmenides meets in the house of Night, at the end of his journey: see, recently, Ferrari 2005, 120–121. Yet, as Burkert has pointed out, this identification reflects the method of the commentators, for one hearing Parmenides’ story has no reason at this point to think of the goddess who is first mentioned at l.45, whereas everything in the immediate context suggests that the deity is Helios.
and a lintel and a stone threshold hold them on both sides.
And they themselves high in the air\(^{50}\) are filled with great doors;
And hard-pushing Justice holds their alternating bolts.
Appeasing her with gentle words, the maidens
shrewdly persuaded her to push the pin-fastened bolt
for them swiftly back from the gates. And in the doormframe these
made a yawning chasm as they swung open …

The Daughters of the Sun drive Parmenides to the gates of the paths of Night and Day
which are held together by a lintel and a stone threshold, and filled with great doors. These
are guarded by Justice who, by holding their bolts, guarantees the regular alternation of
night and day through the gates and, subsequently, on our earth.\(^{51}\) The Daughters of the
Sun persuaded Dike with gentle words to open the doors and let Parmenides through. As
the doors open, a yawning chasm appears in front of Parmenides. Through it, Parmenides
can finally reach the house of Night where he meets the goddess who, after having warmly
welcomed him, reveals him the true nature of the things, namely Parmenides’ philosophy.

While the journey of Parmenides runs on a path that leads Parmenides to the revela-
tion of his philosophy, scholars disagree substantially about the direction of this journey.
Actually, adhering to an ancient line of interpretation that can be drawn back to Sextus
Empiricus, scholars have attempted to read Parmenides’ poem as a symbolic story to
indicate enlightenment. Accordingly, they explain Parmenides’ prologue as a journey to
light.\(^{52}\) However, against this line of interpretation some scholars objected that plenty
of traditional motifs, skilfully employed by Parmenides to describe the geography of
the place he goes through, rather indicate that Parmenides’ journey is a \textit{katabasis} to the
underworld,\(^{53}\) Specifically, the description of the gates of the paths of Night and Day calls
mind the familiar region of the underworld frequently depicted in the traditional epic
poetry.\(^{54}\) In particular, Hesiod in the \textit{Theogony} describes “the awful house of murky Night”
and, in front of it, the place “where Night and Day draw near and greet each other as they
pass the great threshold of bronze; and while the one is about to go down into the house,
the other comes out at the door”\(^{55}\) Elsewhere Hesiod told us that the house of Night is
at the world’s end, beyond glorious Ocean (\textit{Theog} 274–275). This corresponds to the way
to Hades and, in fact, Odysseus is instructed to go with his ship across Ocean to reach the
broad house of Hades.\(^{56}\) Parmenides tells us that, to pick up him, the Daughters of the Sun
leave the house of Night that is traditionally considered their abode too, as we apprehend
from Stesichorus.\(^{57}\) Additionally, the \textit{chasma achanes} that appears before Parmenides once
Justice opens the gates recalls the \textit{chasma mega} described by Hesiod \textit{Theog}. 742. This is at the

\(^{50}\) For the meaning of \textit{αἰθέριαι} cf. Aesch. \textit{Th}. 81 where \textit{αἰθέρια κόνις} means “dust raising up to the sky”; cf. Cerri 1999, 177.
\(^{51}\) Note that according to Heraclitus, Dike (and her Erinyes) monitors that the sun does not overstep its
borders, and punishes it in the case it does: cf. DK 22 B 94.
\(^{52}\) Diels 1897; Kranz 1918; Bowra 1957; Guthrie 1969, 9–10, and more recently Kahn 2009
\(^{53}\) This point was first made by Morrison 1955 and was then developed by Burkert 1969. Nowadays the
majority of scholars maintain that Parmenides’ journey is a \textit{katabasis}.
\(^{55}\) Hes \textit{Theog}. 744-57. Since it has been noted that some of the details of Parmenides’ description are different
from Hesiod’s topography, it is worth remembering, as Palmer 2004, 55, has already highlighted, that
“Parmenides is not slavishly copying Hesiod. Instead, it appears that both he and Hesiod are elaborating
a very old motif with deeper roots in Babylonian mythology”.
\(^{56}\) Hom. \textit{Od}. 10.528.
\(^{57}\) Parm. Ap. \textit{Athen}. 11.469E.
border of the universe, right there where we find the house of Night. It seems therefore plausible to assume that Parmenides, by employing plenty of details belonging to the traditional topography of the underworld, wants to depict his journey as a *katabasis*.58 As J.S. Morrison has pointed out: “we should recall that *katabaseis ... were a recognised method of obtaining a revelation of truth*”59

From the parallels mentioned above, which are not exhaustive, it seems clear that Parmenides’ prologue is finely composed through analogies with the epic tradition depicting extraordinary paths and fantastic destinations to the underworld. To be sure, almost every word in Parmenides’ prologue seems to be there expressly to call to mind epic passages and traditional scenes, in order to convey the image of an exceptional journey to the underworld, a journey analogous to that already made by epic and legendary heroes. Scholars have not failed, over the years, to register and analyse these echoes and parallels.60 There is no doubt that the studies of Parmenides have made headway in showing plain analogies (and intentional differences) of Parmenides’ journey with the journey of Phaethon who travelled on the chariot of the sun,61 with the Homeric account of Odysseus’ journey to Hades,62 and with the legendary *katabasis* of Pythagoras.63 In particular, unlike Phaethon,64 Parmenides is led along the course of the sun “by Right and Justice” (*themis te kai dikē te*), as the goddess assures him (B 1.26-8). Moreover, like Odysseus’ and Pythagoras’ journeys, also the journey depicted by Parmenides is a *katabasis*. Yet travelling to the underworld means, as Morrison emphasized, accomplishing a journey to knowledge. In fact, Parmenides’ journey leads him to receive divine revelation and, consequently, knowledge. Thus, we can safely assume that all Parmenides’ echoes and parallels are precisely meant to convey the idea that Parmenides is a hero who, like Odysseus and Pythagoras, was allowed, through an extraordinary experience, to receive divine wisdom.

What does all this have to do with activation of metaphoricity and deliberate metaphor use? To answer this question, let us look more closely through Parmenides’ strategy. On the one hand, as we have seen in the previous chapter, Parmenides accumulates metaphors from the same cluster, combines them together, plays with word-roots relating to the same metaphor domain, depicts ignorant men in terms of people borne along on a wrong paths that turns back on itself, and so on. Doing so, he activates metaphoricity in a conventionalized metaphor cluster, thereby focusing on and emphasizing the correlation between arguments (or methods) of enquiry and paths, traveller and enquirer, knowledge and destination of a journey. On the other hand, as we have seen above, he opens his poem with the account of his journey – which he presents, in allegorical terms,65

---

58 Other traditional elements which indicate that Parmenides’ journey is a *katabasis* are collected by Burkert 1969 esp. at 1–22. See also Palmer 2008, 54–61. A brief overview of the traditional motifs indicating a Parmenidean *katabasis* can be found in Mourelatos 2008, 14–16, who also lists motifs that might point to a journey to Light.

59 Morrison 1955, 60.

60 Already Diels 1897, 11–12, but see more recently Ranzato 2015, esp. 25–118, also for further references and an up-to-date bibliography.


63 See Burkert 1969.

64 As is known, the journey of Phaethon on his father’s chariot led to disaster: Phaethon’s inability to control its horses forced Zeus to kill him to prevent the earth be destroyed by fire. Mentions of this myths can already be found in Hesiod (fr. 311, ap. Hyg. *Fab.* 154), while the story was presumably the object of Aeschylus’ tragedy *Heliodae* (fr. 68–72) and of the lost Euripides’ *Phaethon*. This myth is known to us thanks to Ovid’s *Met.* 1. 752–2.400, while an exegesis of it can be found in Procl. *In Ti.* 1. 33E–35D.

65 Crisp 2003, 117, defines allegory as a “superextended metaphor”, namely a metaphor “extended to the point where all direct target reference is eliminated”: See moreover at p.129: “Allegories can be regarded as superextended metaphors. The result of their ‘superextension’, however, is to remove all language relating directly to metaphorical target. What remains is language that refers to and describes the metaphorical source, both literally and non-literally”. Accordingly, we can refer to Parmenides’ proem as an allegory
as a possible, fictional, journey he once made – on a divine path to the place that is traditionally considered as the source of knowledge. In other words, while Parmenides' philosophy is meant to be understood in terms of a metaphorical path that a metaphorical traveller has to go down until he reaches knowledge, as it were the destination of his path, Parmenides recounted a fictional situation presenting a divine path that he once followed to reach true knowledge. Moreover, when mentioning the two ways of enquiry, and activating this metaphor, he refers back to his journey on the divine path in the prologue by *verbatim* internal references. That is, he deliberately draws the audience's attention to his extraordinary experience when introducing the arguments and methods of his philosophy. In this account, note that Parmenides' journey displays elements which are related in a particular way not only to the source domain of path, but also indirectly to the target domain of argument, since Parmenides' journey is on a path that leads to knowledge.

One can hardly overlook the remarkable role that concepts concerning path, journey and destination play in Parmenides' philosophical discourse. As scholars have highlighted, the motif connected to *path* (and to *journey*) constitutes the central and 'unifying motif' of Parmenides' poem as a whole.\(^66\) I would argue that Parmenides aimed to intertwine the motif of his possible, fictional journey to knowledge with the metaphorical journey of one who wishes to know and the metaphorical path of enquiry she should follow.\(^67\) My claim here is that this intertwining is a poetical strategy pointing to a high degree of deliberate metaphor use. In fact, it is a very powerful device to activate to a high extent a conventional metaphor cluster. After all, as Müller has pointed out, “the more

in the sense Crisp points out: “Allegory in literary contexts refers to fiction that are given a continuously metaphorical interpretation […] What all allegories […] have in common is that they never refer directly to their metaphorical target. Direct reference is only to the metaphorical source constructed as a fictional situation”, Crisp [2005], 115–116; emphasis added. At p.127–128, Crisp clarifies this conclusion: “There is no longer any of that mixing or “blending” of source- and target-related language that is the linguistic basis for conceptual blending [as for instance in an extended metaphor]. The language of allegory simply refers to and describes the metaphorical source. It thus consists of a set of possible references and predications, or, to speak less literally, the source is construed as a possible, fictional, situation.” (emphasis added). By virtue of this, it can be said that Parmenides, in his introductory depiction of his extraordinary journey, employs non-metaphorically-, but "literally-used language", according to the definition by Crisp [2005], 128. “A distinction between metaphorically- and literally-used language can only be drawn in relation to a possible situation. Language relating directly to that situation is literal; language relating to it indirectly is not,” Crisp [2005], 128.


67 Note that this poetical strategy of intertwining scenes of a non-metaphorical journey and metaphors of the *Lied-Weg* domain is already subverted in the poetical image that opens Parmenides' prologue. In fact, the chariot on which Parmenides is borne to the house of Night might be a metaphor indicating poetry, as Fränkel [1942], d'Alessio [1993], Asper [1997], 21–98; Cerri [1999], esp. 96–98 and Ranzato [2005], 25–28 have shown. As such, this motif is found in several coeval texts belonging to the tradition of the choral poetry and of the epic-didactic poetry: Choral poetry, Pind. *Ol*. 1. 112–113; 6. 1–4 and 22–28 (on which see hereafter); *Pyth*. 12.64; *Isthm*. 1.6; 2.4–5; 8.6; *Pae*. 7b 12–22 Snell-Machl. *Sim*. FF 79.3–4 D; *Bacch*. Ep. 5.176–186. Didactic poetry: Emp. *DK* 31 B 3. Pindar employs it in particular in *Ol*. 6.22–27 where the poet claims that he intends to get on a chariot along a "pure path" (*keleuthōi … en katharai*). The analogies between Pindar’s account of Parmenides’ argumentative strategies are striking. While Pindar’s chariot is driven by mules and leads the poet to metaphorical doors of songs (*pulai humnōn*), Parmenides’ mares lead Parmenides’ chariot to the gates of the paths of night and day, filled with great doors. Furthermore, in the prologue to his *On Nature*, Empedocles, by depicting the Muse driving a well-reined chariot (*κυριάρχων *bharma*: cf. *DK* 31 B 3.5), similarly demonstrates that the chariot is a common metaphor to convey the notion of poetry. In this account note that Parmenides is borne, on his chariot, along a path which is characterised as *poluphēmos*, “of many songs” (B 1.2). This word occurs once in *Od*. 22. 375–376 as epithet of Phemius, the poet “of many songs” of Odysseus’ house, and in *Pind*. *Isthm*. 8.568–61 in which it characterises the Muse’s *thēron* on Achilles’ corpse. In this framework, Parmenides’ wording is likely to convey the idea of the chariot of poetry led along the path of divinely inspired songs. This could even be seen as another device activating metaphorically within the cluster of arguments-paths.
cues point to the source domain, the more active the source domain is at a given moment in time for the language user. In this sense, contextual cues may serve as indicators that allow different degrees of activation in a metaphor to be distinguished. The evoking of fictional images or scenes, which are related to the source domain, might be understood as a contextual cue in ancient literary texts.

8 Purposes behind Parmenides’ deliberate metaphor use

There is another element which plays a significant role in this framework, and which will lead us to look into Parmenides’ purposes when deliberately activating metaphorlicity in the conventional metaphor cluster we are examining. This is related to some details of Parmenides’ account of his journey, which parallel some elements that we find in coeval mystery texts, like the golden tablets from South Italy, Sicily and Thessaly. This might suggest that Parmenides’ extraordinary experience was intended to convey the image of a journey of initiation, not without some eschatological aspects, as scholars have already argued. In this framework, as M.M. Sassi has convincingly pointed out, the motif of the crossroads plays a remarkable role. In fact, accounts of the journeys of the souls to the afterlife follow a recurrent pattern. This includes, among other details, the description of a crossroads between different paths, which the soul has to choose and follow. In the golden tablet from Hipponion in south Italy (modern Vibo Valenzia; 5th century BCE), for example, we read post-mortem instructions for the soul of the initiate in the underworld. The initiate is instructed about the path he has to follow, being warned against descending along the way at the right, where there stands a white cypress, and recommended not to drink from the spring nearby, at which every soul drinks. In contrast, the initiate should go to the Lake of Memory and drink from this water. Thus, he will receive knowledge and a blissful destiny. We read of analogous crossroads among right and left paths leading to different destinations, and resulting in opposite destinies, in the tablet from Petelia in south Italy (modern Stromboli; 4th century BCE), in the tablets from the Timpone Grande in Thurii (south Italy; 4th century BCE), from Entella in Sicily (3rd century BCE) and from Pharsalos in Thessaly (4th century BCE).

68 Müller 2008, 8.
69 The golden tablets I am referring to here are texts found in funerary graves and tumuli of the fifth and fourth century BCE. They consist in brief texts in hexameter, written in small pieces of gold, and destined to provide post-mortem instructions for the initiates in the underworld. Scholars have suggested that the texts engraved in the tablets come from a more ancient oral tradition which employed, like Parmenides’ poem, Homeric material: cf. Edmond 1904, 32, and Ferrari 2007, 120–121. In this framework, note that there are remarkable verbatim parallels between the text of the golden tablet from Hipponion and Parmenides’ poem: see Ferrari 2005, 115–117. A detailed analysis of the tablets can be read in Pugliese Carratelli 2001; Bernabé and Jiménez 2003; Graf and Johnston 2013.
70 Note that eidōs phōs (B 1.3) and kouros (B 1.24) have been examined as elements indicating a mystery-initiatory context, as already Diels 1987: 49 highlighted. See moreover Burkert 1969: 5 with n.11 and at 14 with n.32. More recently see Ferrari 2005, 123.
73 There is also a quick mention of a spring on the right, or on the left, “where the cypress is” in the group of tablets from Eleutherna in Crete (2nd–1st century BCE). An analogue geography of the underworld seems to be well known to Plato who is likely to have drawn from it when talking about the souls in the afterlife in his dialogues. This is above all evident in the story of Er who, like Parmenides, is the protagonist of a katabasis. In the tenth book of Plato’s Republic (614b) Er, recounting his extraordinary journey to the underworld, describes the place he went through as a sort of great crossroads among yawning and different paths that lead the souls to different destinations. Specifically, we are told of a daimonom toupo where there are four chasmata and right and left paths through which souls go according to their past behaviour. Analogously in the Gorgias 524a, Plato describes two judges of the souls in the
All this seems to be evidence for a twofold conclusion. On the one hand, the geography of the underworld as depicted in the golden tablets presents some elements - crossroads among paths leading to different directions and resulting in opposite destinies - that also have a highly symbolic character. On the other hand, this ultra-mundane geography was widespread in the fifth century BCE in south Italy, not far from Elea, hometown and centre of Parmenides’ activity. It is very possible that Parmenides knew and drew from it when depicting the details of the topography of his journey. Accordingly, certain aspects of his journey might have been meant to recall to the audience’s mind those mystery journeys of the souls to the underworld. Thus, as the initiates in the golden tablets, Parmenides too is faced with a very special crossroads at the end of his journey. In fact, this crossroads is not part of the account of his journey in the prologue, but is included in his philosophical discourse: it is the crossroads between the two ways of enquiry and has, in this account, a metaphorical value. I would argue that this is another device to render the metaphor cluster we are examining active. It seems to be related to the activation device of evoking images or scenes that we have seen in the previous section. In fact, also in this case, Parmenides is skilfully intertwining verbal metaphors with images, evoked in the audience’s mind, that foreground some aspects of the metaphor cluster without labelling them. In particular, the verbal metaphors of the two ways of enquiry, closely following the account of Parmenides’ \textit{katabasis}, might have called to the audience’s mind extra-mundane journeys along different paths leading to a crossroads between ignorance or knowledge, perdition or salvation.

Therefore, through this deliberate intertwining, Parmenides’ metaphorical crossroads between ways of enquiry takes concrete shape. This masterful sequence – possible, fictional, journey leading to a metaphorical crossroads - serves to dramatize one’s own choice towards the right way of enquiry. In fact, Parmenides’ figurative and evocative language might deliberately suggest the idea that, just as the initiate has the chance to make a crucial choice for his/her future destiny, anyone who wishes to know about natural philosophy has the possibility to make an analogous choice. The choice of the right path, consequently, becomes crucial not only for the extraordinary traveller, but also for anyone who aims to know.

This – I would argue – is the main purpose behind Parmenides’ deliberate metaphor use: to convince his audience that the philosophy he is proposing is the only true word about the physical world and, consequently, it is worth being followed. Surely the image of the crossroads between two opposite paths has a strongly philosophical value in Parmenides’ poem: it is very apt to depict Parmenides’ philosophical dilemma and his idea of \textit{tertium non datur}: either it is or it is not. Yet, while the goddess urges Parmenides to adopt a specific method of enquiry, to abandon the antipodal method, and to follow a specific theory about the physical world, Parmenides wishes to present and promote his philosophy by persuading his audience (that is his potential followers) to make the right choice: the choice for his philosophy. At the core of his philosophical arguing, Parmenides might have felt the need to emphasize that choosing his philosophy is not just an option among other valuable alternatives. Rather, it coincides with initiation. In other words, such a choice, since it is between mutually exclusive paths, indeed opposite paths, entails the chance to get true knowledge against unawareness. Once the “travellers” have made the effort to choose the unusual but right “path”, they will experience an extraordinary “journey” that “will lead” them to the promised “destination”, the root of true wisdom, and rescue them from their original condition as randomly wandering men. Parmenides’ deliberate metaphor use, in conclusion, conveys the lively and dramatic idea that the underworld, Minos and Radamanthys, who give sentence “in the meadow at the crossroads of the road, where there are two ways leading, one to the isle of the Blest and the other to Tartarus”.

knowledge of the truth, that is Parmenides’ philosophy, coincides with a path of initiation and as such is really a matter of life or death.

9 Conclusion

From the analysis of Parmenides’ expressions which have been considered as linguistic realizations of the conceptual metaphor *an argument defines a path*, it has been shown in which way and to what extent Parmenides aimed to wake up certain sleeping metaphors. In fact, kinds of metaphors relating to the cluster arguments-paths were entrenched at Parmenides’ time. Thus, while an average language user could not have perceived their metaphorical value in its entirety anymore, Parmenides employs plenty of devices which indicate activation of metaphoricity, in order to deliberately focus the hearer’s/reader’s attention on their figurative power.

As has been shown throughout, Parmenides employs devices that have already been recognized in modern metaphor studies as tools activating metaphoricity, like the devices of composing, repetition, word-play, juxtaposition of etymologically related words and estranging effects obtained by the use of either an unusual term or common terms in unusual wordings. However, he also employs further devices which can be regarded as unique to ancient texts and, specifically, to the genre of Parmenides’ text. As we have analyzed, Parmenides’ most powerful device activating metaphoricity is the evoking of scenes or images in his audience’s mind, scenes which point to the metaphor domain, but are meant to be elements of a possible, fictional, situation. These can be either scenes narrated in a previous part of Parmenides’ poem, as in the case of Parmenides’ extraordinary journey depicted in the prologue to his philosophy, and called to mind by means of *verbatim* parallels. Alternatively, Parmenides can also evoke scenes which are not explicitly depicted in his poem, but belong to the tradition of epic-didactic poetry, well known to Parmenides’ audience. These were called to mind through poetical echoes and parallels both with the Homeric and Hesiodic poems (which Parmenides’ audience was familiar with), and with coeval texts (the golden tablets in particular) describing journeys to the underworld. Furthermore, the way in which Parmenides organizes all this material is amazingly skilful: he intertwines verbal metaphors belonging to the cluster of arguments-paths with possible, fictional, or even religious journeys that straightforwardly point both to the source domain of paths and even to the target domain of arguments (since these journeys are along paths that lead to knowledge). This “intertwining” has been considered as a very powerful device activating metaphoricity and pointing to deliberate metaphor use. Finally, this study has highlighted that Parmenides’ main purpose, when deliberately activating metaphoricity, is to convince his audience to adhere to his philosophy, by conveying the dramatic idea that the choice for his philosophy coincides with initiation into true wisdom. In other terms the choice for Parmenides’ philosophy is not a possibility among others plausible alternatives, but rather a decision towards awareness against ignorance and, consequently, a matter of life and death.

My main purpose in this study, on the other hand, has been to show that applying modern metaphor theories to ancient texts might prove very insightful and useful for interpretive purposes. In fact, the results achieved through an analysis of this sort might be of interest both for original development and for expansion of the studies of ancient texts, as well as for advancements and refinements in contemporary metaphor studies, since ancient texts constitute a fruitful and challenging field of analysis for applied metaphor theory.
References

Asper 1997

Battezzato 2005

Becker 1937

Beger 2011

Bernabé and Jiménez 2008

Black 1993

Bowra 1937

Burkert 1969

Cameron 2003

Cerri 1995

Cerri 1999

Cordero 2004

Cornford 1952
Cosgrove 2011

Crisp 2005

d’Alessio 1995

Diels 1897

Edmond 2004

Ferrari 2005

Ferrari 2007

Feyerabend 1984

Fränkel 1951

Gibbs 1994

Gibbs 2011

Graf and Johnston 2013

Guthrie 1965
Havelock 1958

Kahn 2009

Kingsley 1995

Kövecses 2002

Kranz 1916

Kyratzis 2003

Lakoff 1993

Lakoff and Johnson 1980

Lakoff and Turner 1989

Morrison 1955

Mourelatos 2008

Müller 2008

Pagliaro 1953

Palmer 2009
Pugliese Carratelli 1988

Pugliese Carratelli 2001

Ranzato 2015

Reale and Ruggiu 2003

Sassi 1988

Semino 2008

Steen 2008

Steen 2011a

Steen 2011b

Steen 2015

Steen (in press)
Chiara Ferella  
(PhD Pisa 2011) studied Classics at the Universities of L'Aquila, Cambridge, Pisa and Munich. She has published on pre-Socratics, the Derveni Papyrus and on metaphor use in early Greek philosophy. Since 2015 she is a post-doc Fellow at the Excellence Cluster Topoi in Berlin, within the Research Group C-2 Space and metaphor in cognition, language, and texts. At present, she is working on a research project exploring metaphor use in early Greek philosophical discourse.

Dr. Chiara Ferella  
Excellence Cluster 264 Topoi  
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin  
Hannoversche Str. 6  
10115 Berlin, Germany  
ferellac@hu-berlin.de