Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice

Edited by Gerd Graßhoff and Michael Meyer,
Excellence Cluster Topoi, Berlin

eTopoi ISSN 2192-2608
http://journal.topoi.org

Except where otherwise noted, content is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 License:
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0
Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice

Group C-2 of the Excellence Cluster 264 Topoi Space and Metaphor in Language, Cognition, and Texts is dedicated to the study of spatial metaphors and their functions in texts of different genres, languages, and epochs. This outline of the work of group C-2 takes as its point of departure and theoretical framework a general linguistic typology of spatial metaphors. This outline is followed by a series of case studies ranging from wisdom texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean English. These examples are aimed at illustrating both the challenges and the possibilities of the study and interpretation of spatial metaphors in their respective contexts.

Metaphor analysis; metaphor typology; spatial metaphors; orientational metaphors; conceptual metaphor theory; metaphorical spaces; spatial thinking.

1 Introduction

The project of Group C-2 of the Excellence Cluster 264 Topoi Space and Metaphor in Language, Cognition, and Texts is dedicated to the study of spatial metaphors used by diverse cultures from antiquity through the early modern era to the present day. Its research begins with the observation that spatial metaphors emerge due to a universal principle by which non-spatial (and also other spatial) subject matter can be cognitively grasped, processed, and verbally represented in spatial terms. Although this principle is indisputably universal, it is nevertheless implemented in language-specific ways which, depending on the available linguistic resources, allow for the formation of a culturally conditioned conceptualization of space. However, the concept of space is not necessarily associated with cognition or language (whether spoken or written), whereas metaphors are implicitly linked to both: they originate in thought\(^1\) and then find their expression in language and texts. Hence, this article will take as its point of departure a proposition for a linguistic typology of metaphors in order to establish a theoretical framework for the classification of spatial metaphors. The case studies that follow are taken from different languages and genres and will showcase the range and diversity of applications of spatial imagery in texts.

2 Towards a typology of spatial metaphors

The following typology of spatial metaphors is purely technical, according to the specificity of the spatial concept employed metaphorically (difference between types 1 and 2) and the extent of the metaphor (difference between types 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3). This schema does not take into consideration all the various possible functions of spatial metaphors. Like all metaphors, they may have an explicatory, didactic, persuasive, or evaluative purpose and perhaps even encompass novelty of expression for a particular purpose. They may

\(^1\) Cf. e.g. Gibbs 1996.
also, in some cases, serve no function in their respective context, particularly if they are conventional (entrenched), and in these cases their use might not even be deliberate.  

1. Our first type of spatial metaphor is called orientational. The term derives from cognitive metaphor theory, which defines metaphor very generally as speaking of something in terms of something else. This is effected in terms of a mapping between two previously unrelated conceptual domains: the tenor from a specific target domain is conceptualized in terms of a vehicle from a different source domain. The mapping transfers the structure of the source domain and imposes it on the target domain; the resulting conceptualization is referred to as a conceptual metaphor and expressed as target is source. The defining feature of orientational metaphors is the use of abstract spatial configurations (instead of specific locations or places), such as inside – outside, up – down, left – right, or center – periphery, to give spatial orientation or structure to a non-spatial concept. Often, two opposite spatial conceptualizations are correlated, such as in up is more and down is less, or right is good with the correlate left is bad. However, this type of metaphor is often no longer recognized as a metaphor due to the conventionality of the underlying conceptualizations. Thus, orientational metaphors are very often non-deliberate and conventional, but sometimes available as a basis for new metaphoric expressions as well.

2. In contrast to this first type of orientational metaphor, which relies on abstract spatial relations and configurations, the next class of spatial metaphors utilizes more specific locations or places. Thus, metaphors belonging to this class can be spotted more easily, since they possess a higher degree of metaphoricity. In the following classification, they will be arranged according to the cognitive extent of the metaphor, which may vary according to the text in which a particular metaphor occurs or to the author employing it.

2.1. The first, and most basic, type of this class of spatial metaphor is the use of a concrete or specific space or location on the lexical level when spatial characteristics are applied to a single word or phrase. This occurs when a non-spatial term is referred to, or used, as if it were a place or space, or when one spatial term might be metaphorically

---

2 For the use of the categories 'conventional' and 'deliberate' cf. e.g. Steen 2008 and Steen 2011, 38–43. Contrary to earlier theories of metaphor, cognitive metaphor theory holds that deliberate usage is not a requirement for the identification of metaphor. For a theoretical approach to distinguishing varying degrees of 'metaphoricity', i.e. the degree to which an individual textual metaphor is regarded as metaphorical by a recipient (as opposed to applying the obsolete 'dead' – 'alive' distinction, which was already criticized by Richards 1936, 101–102) see Hanks 2000 or Müller 2008, esp. 178–209; Müller defines metaphoricity as a continuum starting with expressions whose original metaphorical character is entirely obscured by semantic opacity and poetic novel metaphors with high metaphoricity forming the other end of the spectrum.


4 Cf. Lakoff and Johnson 1980, 36 et passim: "Metaphor is principally a way of conceiving of one thing in terms of another." This general definition seems to echo the definition in Aristot. poet. 1457b6–7: μεταφορὰ δέ ἐστιν ὀνόματος ἀλλοτρίου ἐπιφορὰ (…) “metaphor is the transfer of a foreign name”. For a cognitive perspective on Aristotle’s position also see Mahon 1999.

5 The terms ‘tenor’ and ‘vehicle’ were first introduced by Richards 1936, 101–102 to denote the two components of a metaphor, but they have come to be used as general convenient terms for the signifier and the signified of a metaphorical transfer. ‘Source domain’, ‘mapping’, and ‘target domain’ belong to the terminology of conceptual metaphor theory.

6 We here follow the convention in cognitive linguistics to print conceptual metaphors (as opposed to individual linguistic metaphors) in small capitals to indicate that they do not appear as such in texts, but are deduced from individual textual occurrences of metaphorical language.

7 For an attempt to define and analyze metaphor on the lexical level through the difference between basic and contextual meaning see Crisp et al. 2007, esp. 3, also summarized in Semino 2008, 11–12, further developed in Steen et al. 2010, esp. 1–42.
conceived of in terms of another, different space or place. These metaphors result from a simple transfer of vehicle to tenor without multiple mappings and are therefore isolated, i.e. non-conceptual.

2.2. A second, and more extensive, type of spatial metaphor is the use of a specific space or location on the conceptual level. While the conceptual metaphor must still be instantiated on the lexical level of individual linguistic metaphors, it is not a single word, but a whole concept which is given spatial properties by means of metaphoric transfer. This happens when a spatial metaphor on the lexical level can be regarded as a mapping of a more extensive underlying conceptualization. In the case of this second type of spatial metaphor, it is insufficient to view tenor and vehicle as isolated lexical entities, but they have to be regarded as parts of their respective domains. Thus, this type of metaphor entails multiple transfers, i.e. mappings, which form conceptual metaphors with a spatial source domain being correlated with a target domain. For such mappings to qualify for the category of spatial conceptual metaphor, the source domain must be spatial, while the target domain may, but need not, be a spatial concept.

2.3. The most extensive type of spatial metaphor can be found in cases where a specific space or location is used metaphorically on a broader textual level. It is possible for a longer narration or even a whole text to function as a spatial metaphor (something like a macro-metaphor). Assuming the traditional definition of allegory as ‘extended metaphor’, this type could also be described as spatial allegory.

3 Case studies from ancient, medieval, and early modern languages and texts

Literary scholars attempting to apply a theoretical model of metaphor by using a theoretically-based method to analyze their texts cannot fail to encounter the difficulties posed by the range and diversity of metaphors in context. Metaphors differ widely in both form and meaning, and the analysis of an individual linguistic metaphor often necessitates considerable interpretative effort that cannot simply be transferred to another metaphor. Thus, the following case studies are aimed not only at illustrating the possibilities of applying the typology of spatial metaphors outlined above to actual linguistic metaphors in discourse. They also indicate the extent to which the study of texts requires the theoretical framework in question to be modified in order to do justice to the creation and function of spatial metaphors in their respective contexts. Furthermore, in the process they demonstrate how drawing on additional theoretical approaches can inform and enrich the study of metaphors in texts.

8 In the third conceivable case of a spatial term being denoted by a non-spatial term we would not call the result of the transfer a spatial metaphor.
9 In cognitive metaphor theory, the terms ‘image metaphor’ or ‘one-shot metaphor’ are occasionally employed to denote this type of isolated mapping, cf. Lakoff and Turner [1989, 89–96 and the definition in Kövecses [2010, 327: “One-shot image metaphors involve the superimposition of one rich image onto another rich image. (…) These cases are called ‘one-shot’ metaphors because, in them, we bring into correspondence two rich images for a temporary purpose on a particular occasion.”
10 For the theoretical basis of interpreting metaphors as cross-domain mappings see the fundamental works of the cognitive linguistic theory of conceptual metaphors, esp. Lakoff and Johnson [1980], Lakoff and Turner [1989], Lakoff [1993]. A recent assessment of the theory can be found in Steen [2011].
11 The use of several metaphorical expressions from one target domain referring to the same source domain has been described as ‘extension’ by Semino [2008, 25–26]. However, for this type of conceptual metaphor to be present in a text it is not necessary that extension occurs; if a lexical metaphor is isolated, but evokes the metaphorical equation of two domains, it is already possible to speak of a conceptual metaphor.
13 On the context sensitivity of metaphors see e.g. Stern [2003].
3.1 The multiple levels of spatial metaphor in the ancient Egyptian ‘Teaching’ of Menena

The Teaching of Menena,14 in which the exasperated Menena remonstrates his son Pai-iri for his worldly ways, provides some of Egyptology’s best-known examples of rhetorical language. Much of this is due to the simultaneously conventional and highly innovative use of spatial metaphors. As we shall see in other contributions (see the sections on the Pauline epistles and the works of John Chrysostom below), there seems to be a tendency across cultures to conceive of life choices in terms of space and particularly in terms of path, which explains why corrective or generally persuasive genres tend to employ these metaphorical strategies.

In any case, it is clear from the outset that the letter-writer/speaker Menena employs such strategies at a very high level, demonstrating a degree of creativity not always expected of such pedestrian metaphors. Not only are deliberate15 spatial metaphors apparent throughout the text, they frame the whole text. They also appear at both the lexical level and at a conceptual level that develops linguistically throughout the whole text in the manner of ‘metaphor scenarios’.16 The metaphors thus conform in great measure to types 2.1. and 2.2. of the proposed typology.

At the lexical level, overt spatial source domains like ‘path’ are clustered with associated source domains of the ground, like ‘undergrowth,’ ‘sandals,’ or ‘thorn,’ of the air, like ‘the route of the swallow’ and of water, like ‘storm,’ ‘sea,’ ‘sailing,’ or ‘capsizing.’

These lexical features contribute significantly to the construction of a metaphor scenario based on the conceptual metaphor life is a journey. The path metaphor is introduced using a sailing metaphor (which is a citation of a much earlier text, marked in italics): “The storm was foretold for you before it arrived, my sailor, who is unskilled in landing.”17 By way of highlighting the metaphoricity of this statement and extending the scenario, an explicitly earth-bound path metaphor follows: “I am informed about every path upon which [sc. the evil being] ‘Fierce-of-Face’ lurks in the undergrowth.”18

Both earth- and water-bound motifs are developed in the course of the text without straying from the ‘path’ source domain. We will note two particularly innovative cases thereof, which recur across the text as rhetorical flourishes. In the first instance, Menena describes the misplaced confidence of his wayward son in the following way: “You have gone off without sandals because you have not yet been brought back by a thorn.”19 Later, the hopelessness of the situation is demonstrated by the recurrence of ‘thorn’ in the context of a sea journey: “Look, I [i.e. Menena] have brought a thorn a cubit long onto the submerged path but there is no way of beating it in.”20 Here the deliberateness of the metaphor is emphasized by its seeming incongruity – how does one lay a thorn on a path that is actually water? – as well as by its clear reliance on the earlier metaphor of the barefoot (read: unprepared) Pai-iri not having yet stepped on a thorn (read: encountered difficulty).

In the second instance, the word ‘capsizing’ is echoed by another, seemingly morally-charged word ‘turning around.’ The latter is used in relation to Pai-iri himself being ‘turned around’ – in other words, perverted.21 However, later in the text, the exhortation

---

14 Ostracon Chicago OIC 12754 + Ostracon IFAO Inv. 2188. The text has been dated to the reigns of Ramesses III – Ramesses VI, ca. 1150 BCE (http://aaew.bbaw.de/tla – visited on 04/05/2016).
15 Steen 224.
16 Musolff 224.
17 Rto 1–2.
18 Rto 2–3.
19 Rto 3.
20 Vso 6–7.
21 Rto 6 and Vso 3.
to “turn yourself (back) around in order to consider my speech” uses the same word. From this, we see that the semantic boundaries of the word were being played with by the author(s) to create a complex but only seemingly contradictory metaphor: the meaning seems to be simply “turning 180 degrees” – for better or for worse.

What we can see from this case study is that Ancient Egyptian instances of path metaphors correspond surprisingly well to features of the classical corpus, thereby reinforcing the proposed typology and providing exceedingly promising avenues (pardon the metaphor) for future collaborative research.

3.2 On the predicament of metaphor as transfer. The Greek symposion and the mixing-vessel

The study of any type of metaphor requires an examination of Aristotle’s (384–322 BCE) definition of metaphor.\textsuperscript{23} The noun \textit{metaphora} (literally ‘transfer’) which occurs first in the work of the orator Isocrates (436–338 BCE) as a designation of certain poetic techniques\textsuperscript{24} is conceptualized philosophically by Aristotle some decades later and is conceived as the result of a universal – linguistic and cognitive – process of transfer. Thus, the word ‘metaphor’ itself is from the beginning defined as a metaphor, that is to say a transfer in the figurative sense: the concrete spatial process of ‘transporting’ is transmuted into a dynamic mental ‘transporting’: Aristotle’s theory of metaphor is a theory of comparison, which is epistemologically substantiated and thus exceeds by far the limits of rhetoric. According to Aristotle, metaphor presupposes that two elements can be thought of as similar (even identical in some respects) as well as different and that in language, for this reason, one can be used instead of the other. This constitutes for him the reflexive, epistemologically relevant value of metaphor, since metaphor stimulates reflecting upon possible common characteristics of two material or mental elements despite their differences. This gives rise to the “problem of the relationship between language, thought, reality”, which so far has not been solved, even by modern metaphor theories such as those of cognitive linguistics.\textsuperscript{25} Hence the currently popular theory designating metaphor as a relation between a ‘source domain’ and a ‘target domain’ with associated ‘mappings’ (i.e. projections from the first domain onto the second) remains confined to Aristotle’s theory of comparison,\textsuperscript{26} in spite of the harsh critique ventured upon it.

As a matter of fact, Aristotle, unlike many of his successors since the Roman theoreticians of rhetoric, does not perceive metaphor as a mere substitution. Furthermore, he does not assume, as is often claimed, that metaphor is a replacement of something basically ‘proper’ (or ‘appropriate’) by something basically ‘improper’ (or ‘inappropriate’). In fact, he emphasizes that metaphorical processes of transfer, which he divides into four categories (from genus to species, from species to genus, from species to species, and according to analogy), are not unidirectionally fixed.\textsuperscript{27} Rather, such transfers can run in two opposite directions, and it is only the respective starting point that determines the orientation of the perspective from which the comparison issues.

\textsuperscript{22} Vso 9–10.\
\textsuperscript{23} Aristot. \textit{poet.} 21, 1.457b; \textit{rhet.} III, 1.453a–b, 1.456b–1.457a.\
\textsuperscript{24} Isocr. 9.9: in plural (\textit{μεταφοραί}).\
\textsuperscript{25} See Eggs 2001, 1102.\
\textsuperscript{26} Lakoff and Johnson 1980 etc.; cf. the critical assessment of Eggs 2001, 1156.\
\textsuperscript{27} On this matter and on the metaphysical and theological implications of Aristotle’s notion of metaphor as well as on the problem of its applicability to ancient Greek lyric poetry see Schlesier 1986–1987. Concerning the fallacies connected with the reading of ancient Greek literature in terms of metaphor see also Stanford 1936.
This excludes an absolute valuation or hierarchization of the elements, which are implicitly compared by means of a metaphor. Conversely, Aristotle’s theoretical focus on relations of comparability between two terms entails his definition of these terms as expressions of fixed and necessarily different – concrete or abstract – qualities, which may connote – concrete or abstract – similarities. Therefore Aristotle does not envisage the possibility of an already established semantic or contextual simultaneity or mixture of qualities.

The study of the ancient Greek symposium is well-suited for pursuing the problem of such a simultaneity and mixture with regard to the concept of metaphor in general and spatial metaphors in particular. The Greek symposium is an institution, a social rite, and a medium of conviviality whose cultural significance extends well over the archaic and classical periods and at which various modes of space are simultaneously pragmatically linked and operating on a cognitive and metaphorical level as well. This is triggered through the mixture of several qualities and experiences available in the space of the symposium. It is at the same time a space of religious rituals (libations for the deities of the symposium, cultic poetry), a space for the use of pottery, which often represents the symposium itself and aims at its imaginary construction, a space for aesthetic performances (poetry, music, dance), a space of equally performative and agonistic exchange and interchange involving reciprocity as well as rivalry (poetic, philosophical, erotic, musical), a space of social, sexual, political, and cultural mixture and mobility, a space for the combination of several linguistic forms of communication (discourse, song, mockery, praise, riddle), but also for the overcoming of the constraints of literary and musical genres, a space of ethical education (paideia) and playful pleasure (paidia), a space in which psycho-physical boundaries can be dissolved (by ecstasy, enthouiasmos, inebriation), a space of intertwined sensual perceptions and emotions (shared and potentially conflicting ones), and also a space for the transfer of knowledge and cultural patterns.

The question whether the Aristotelian (or a later) notion of metaphor can do justice to the multiple dimensions of the symposium – which are mixed in such a specific manner – will be demonstrated by the example of the kratēr (literally ‘mixing-object’). This vessel is emblematic for the peculiarity of the ancient Greek drinking party. Thus, it is not surprising that the word kratēr can metonymically denote the symposium. Compared to drinking venues of other cultures, the specificity of the symposium consists in the fact that the Greeks typically refrained from drinking pure wine and usually diluted the wine with water in different proportions, arranged in advance. To this purpose, the kratēr was used (the noun is derived from the verb κεράννυμι, ‘to mix according to a certain proportion’).

Surprisingly, at its second occurrence in ancient literature in Book 1 of Homer’s Iliad, kratēr does not actually denote a vessel in which liquids are mixed: αὐτὰρ ὁ τοῖς ἄλλοισι θεοῖς ἐνδέξια πᾶσιν / οἰνοχόει γλυκὺ νέκταρ ἀπὸ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων (“Moreover this one, for the other gods, to the right, for all of them / he poured out as wine sweet nectar, drawing it from a mixing-vessel.” Translation: R. Schlesier). In this passage, the god Hephaistos is described as cupbearer of the other Olympian gods who draws nectar, the drink of the immortals, from the kratēr. However, the function of the kratēr does not correspond to its literal meaning, since it is not used as a mixing-vessel, but as a space containing

29 A more detailed inquiry is to be found in Schlesier 2014.
31 See e.g. Theogn. 493, 643, 981. On the emblematic function of the kratēr in visual art see Lissarrague 1995.
33 About this vessel, its different shapes, and its usage see e.g. Boardman 2001, 250–253.
an unmixed drink, nectar. Does this make the κρατήρ a metaphor in this context? The Homeric passage highlights that the mixing-vessel, which is specific to human banquets, has its place at the divine banquet as well. In terms of a modern theory of metaphor, one could perhaps say that a spatial ‘target domain’ (the banquet of the gods) is denoted by means of the term κρατήρ stemming from the spatial ‘source domain’ (the banquet of humans), or else, in Aristotle’s terminology, that this usage constitutes a transfer from the species (mixing-vessel) to the genus (liquid container). But does this entail that the word κρατήρ is a comparison (εἰκών)\(^{34}\), in the sense of Aristotle’s general definition of metaphor? Because of its precise functional determination, however, it is impossible to equate the κρατήρ with other vessels not designated for the mixing of liquids. Rather, by means of the inclusion of the κρατήρ into this context, divine and human dimensions of experience are specifically mingled: at the divine banquet a particular vessel is used which belongs by definition to the mixture of wine and water at human banquets, but the gods adapt it for their own purposes and alter its function by employing it as container for the pure drink reserved for them, nectar. Thus, a transfer is at stake here, however not a metaphorical, but a functional one. What the κρατήρ represents in this context is a different mixture from the one of water and wine: it points to the mixture of the human and the divine spheres. It signals that the human dimension is also simultaneously present at the divine banquet and that both kinds of symposion can be compared just like the two kinds

---

\(^{34}\) Aristot. *rhet.* III, 1456b–1457a.
of drinks enjoyed at each. Yet the reflective potential of the present semantic context can apparently only be grasped when the framework of the Aristotelian theory of metaphor has been abandoned or at least expanded.

3.3 Spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles: form and function

The Pauline epistles (written in the 50s of the 1st century CE) are well known for their rich imagery, which makes them an excellent source for investigations into metaphors (spatial or otherwise; also see the following study). Even though the epistles have a clearly didactic and exhortative purpose, the form of their (innovative) metaphors can be analyzed in terms of the fourfold classification of poetic metaphors, as expounded by George Lakoff and Mark Turner. Turning to the function of these metaphors, we contend that they can be analyzed in terms of alienation, but only if this strategy can be used for purposes outside the goal of casting new light on familiar phenomena.

We will first turn to the form of metaphors, starting with the elaboration of metaphors, where elements of the source domain can be mapped in unusual ways onto elements of the target domain. For instance, elaboration shows up for container metaphors in that containers vary widely in the source domain, including less prototypical ones, like clothes, or abstract states, e.g. “put on the Lord Jesus Christ” or “those living in malice and envy.”

Second, metaphors can be explicitly questioned, i.e., the aptness of a metaphor is challenged directly or in terms of showing the limits of the structural mapping from source domain to target domain. For instance, Paul’s famous metaphor about Christian life as a race calls it into question by pointing out that the metaphor fails to emphasize that in the target domain there will be success and reward not only for one single person: “Don’t you know that in a race all the runners run, but only one gets the prize? So run that you may get it.”

The next technique is the combination of metaphors. For instance, human bodies can be introduced simultaneously in terms of the vessel and the house metaphor (body is vessel/house): “We are the temple of the living God.”

Finally, metaphors can be extended in that additional structure is transferred from source domain to the target domain, which does not fit in easily with the target domain. Consider, for example, spatial metaphors presenting faith as a kind of path, thus giving it a sense of direction that seems alien to the concept of faith: “They have swerved from the faith.” This presents faith either as a dynamic development through several stages of completion, or as a kind of guidance on how to lead one’s life.

In sum, Lakoff and Turner’s classification of poetic metaphor has proven to be applicable to the spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles. This classification accounts...
for the form of the metaphors, but does not explicitly address the question of what the function of these metaphors could be, especially in non-poetic discourse.

We contend that poetic metaphors in Paul’s epistles all instantiate a very general function, i.e. they emphasize the differences between source domain and target domain. These differences emerge through the fact that the structural mapping between source domain and target domain is typically not perfect. This emphasis brings about alienation as described by Viktor Schklowski. \(^{44}\) Alienation deliberately aggravates the process of perceiving a phenomenon because it presents the phenomenon in a way that enforces its conscious perception, not just its recognition.

However, if this analysis is on the right track, it raises the question of what purpose is being served by alienation in non-poetic discourse. Poetic as they might be (at least in part), the didactic and persuasive purpose of the Pauline epistles suggests that alienation of metaphors cannot simply be an end in itself. Moreover, if alienation is defined as a process of deliberate de-familiarization, how could it be applied to the epistles, whose topics are entirely novel to their readers (in fact, to anyone)?

Our tentative answer to these questions is that Paul as the founder of Christian theology was constantly breaking new ground. His employment of metaphorical language to do this makes perfect sense, since metaphors are a very natural tool for the description of concepts hitherto unknown. At the same time, he was highly aware of the imprecision inherent in metaphor due to the only partial structural match between source domain and target domain. Consequently, he alienates metaphors in order to heighten the precision of his writings, by warning his readers against taking his metaphors too far. This answer, however, extends the concept of alienation by arguing that it can be used for purposes other than de-familiarization.

3.4 ‘In Christ Jesus’ – Paul’s central metaphor

This case study also deals with spatial metaphors in the Pauline epistles, but rather than analyze different techniques (like the previous example), will focus on one particular instance of a spatial metaphor, Paul’s central metaphor of being ‘in Christ Jesus.’ This metaphor seems to have its origin in the ritual of baptism.

The word ‘Christians’ does not appear until the end of the first century. Addressing, greeting, and blessing the recipients of his letters, Paul sometimes called them the holy ‘in Christ Jesus,’ referring to the local (Christian) assembly. \(^{45}\) Before deciding that the phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’ refers to a specific space, it might help to note instances where Paul explicitly marked ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ spatially. \(^{46}\) This is the case when to be ‘in Christ Jesus’ is preceded by the action that a person is dipped into Christ as if one is dipped into water, \(^{47}\) or puts Christ on as one puts on clothes. In such cases the phrase ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ implies a specific locality inside, ‘in Christ [Jesus],’ in which the person or persons are: “As many of you as were baptized into Christ have clothed yourselves with Christ. … All of you are one ‘in’ Christ Jesus.” \(^{48}\) Paul understood baptism in such a way that when the new believers, who are baptized into Christ Jesus, are dipped into the body of the

---

44 Cf. Schklowski \([1971]\).
45 E.g. 1Cor 1:2; 16:24, Phil. 1:11; 4:21; cf. 1Thess. 2:14; Gal 1,22: ἐν Χριστῷ Ἰησοῦ.
47 To be “baptized into” (βαπτίζομαι cum eic) means ‘to be dipped into another substance’ Cf. Plut. Parall. Gr. et R. h. 305C; Strab. geogr. XII 5,4 \([798]\); Ach. Tat. Leucippe and Cleitophon II 14,9; Flavius Josephus Jewish War 2,476.
crucified Christ, they are buried with Christ.\footnote{Rom 6:3–4.} Baptism was the way in which newcomers gained access to the community of believers. According to Paul, they were all dipped into Christ’s body\footnote{1Cor 12:13.} and are thus ‘in Christ Jesus’, as he puts it.\footnote{2Cor 5:17.} Somebody who is ‘in Christ’ died with Christ and lives a new life in Christ. They are a new creation,\footnote{2Cor 5:17.} God put them in Christ.\footnote{1Cor 1:30.} Those who are not inside, stay outside.

The phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’ is based on the belief of being integrated into the body of the crucified and sharing his resurrected body through baptism. Paul extended the reference of the phrase ‘in Christ Jesus’. He uses the phrase ἐν Χριστῶ ημῶν to designate a metaphorical space which the insiders share. The phrase does not assign believers to a specific local congregation.\footnote{E.g. Rom 16:3, 9; 1Cor 4:17 and Phlm. 1:23.} Those ‘in Christ Jesus’\footnote{E.g. Rom 16:7, 10; 1Cor 4:15; 2Cor 12:2.} could be everywhere, for they are kept together by being ‘in Christ’: “So we, who are many, are one body ‘in’ Christ.”\footnote{Rom 12:5: οὕτως οἱ πολλοὶ ἓν σῶμα ἐσμεν ἐν Χριστῷ.} Paul maps various other aspects of his message unto the basic metaphorical space ‘in Christ Jesus’. Here the promises to Abraham, that people from all nations will belong to the children of God, are fulfilled.\footnote{Gal 3:14, 26–29.} According to Paul ‘in Christ Jesus’ is a metaphorical space, where humans are given redemption from sin, freedom from the Law and God’s peace.\footnote{Rom 3:26; Gal 2:4; Phil 4:7.} Here God justifies the ungodly, reconciles his enemies with him.\footnote{Gal 2:17; 2Cor 5:18; cf. 1Cor 4:10.} In Christ Jesus he will not condemn them,\footnote{Rom 8,1.} but will give eternal life.\footnote{Rom 6:11, 23.} Even those who ‘fall asleep’ (= die) ‘in Christ [Jesus]’ will be raised.\footnote{1Cor 15:18-19; 1Thess 4:16.} For those who are outside, there is no hope.

### 3.5 The spatial metaphors of John Chrysostom

John Chrysostom (c. 349–407 CE) is, as his later epithet suggests, one of the eminent and most prolific preachers of ancient Christianity. In particular, he has earned a reputation for his exuberant and powerful oratory, a style that bristles with drastic phrases, extravagant images and hyperbole.\footnote{On Chrysostom’s rhetoric in its cultural setting see Wilken [1983], 95–127, and in particular on his imagery Kertsch [1993].} Part of his literary legacy is the pervasive use of metaphors, as documented both by individual metaphorical expressions and elaborate metaphorical scenarios or allegories. His employment of metaphorical language in homilies and treatises alike is extremely suitable for an exploration of the ways in which spatial metaphors work in context. Before casting a glance at some examples from his writings we should mention in passing that Chrysostom, as the scion of a Greek upper-class family, received a thorough rhetorical training and that his rhetorical skills are visible across his vast \textit{œuvre}, not least in his metaphors.\footnote{For an overview of Chrysostom’s use of metaphors and their relation to classical rhetoric see Ameringer [1923], 56–67. See further Wilken [1983], 107–110 and 117–120.} Alongside numerous Biblical images, we find a cornucopia
of traditional similes and metaphors, such as those of athletes, economy and seafaring. Chrysostom’s stunning command of rhetoric meant that he knew how to apply the most effective devices to sway his urban audience.

What is striking about Chrysostom’s use of spatial metaphors is that they often occur not individually but grouped to whole clusters of metaphorical expressions, not all of which are necessarily three-dimensional. To drive his point home, the preacher time and again unfolds a wide range of metaphors, images and similes, all highlighting specific qualities of the matter under consideration. A fine case in point is an extract from the homily Cum Saturninus et Aurelianus acti essent in exsilium, where a veritable catalog of images and metaphors throws the opposition between wealth and poverty into sharp relief. First, he presents material wealth as a runaway who never maintains his loyalty to one person but constantly switches from one to the other. However, not content with merely employing a single metaphor, Chrysostom elaborates on this point, adding that wealth is likewise a traitor who hurls his victims into an abyss, a murderer, a beast, a steep cliff, a rock amid unceasing waves, a whole sea battered by constant storms, further a relentless tyrant, a master worse than any barbarian and an enemy who will never give up his hatred. Should the congregation still not have grasped the message, Chrysostom proceeds to characterize poverty in similar fashion, but as the direct opposite. Poverty now figures as an asylum, a safe haven, constant safety, well-being without any danger, life free from waves, mother of wisdom and root of humility. It is interesting to note how carefully Chrysostom crafts this contrasting pair of metaphorical catalogs so that his flock cannot but be overwhelmed by the sheer mass of images. As elsewhere, he clusters a whole range of graphic expressions, some of them metaphorical, increasing its effect through antitheses, parallelisms, isocola and verbal resonances.

At first glance, this firework of metaphors results in overkill, as the audience is not allowed sufficient time to dwell on one individual metaphor and reflect on its full import. What we encounter in this and similar passages is a list of linguistic metaphors rather than a detailed concept that is mapped onto an abstract domain. It is evident that such a kaleidoscope is highly indebted to the training in the rhetorical schools of late antiquity, where students, through the repetition of preliminary exercises, learned to build up a good stock of ready-made expressions to be used in oratorical improvisation. Moreover, the metaphors seem to be unconnected or even unsuitable, as Chrysostom combines human characters in action with static features of nature. There is, however, a rationale behind the cluster. The impressive range of metaphors is integrated by the view that wealth, despite the love of its followers, is an unstable and difficult possession, which will ultimately ruin its possessor, whereas poverty is a state of peace of mind, which creates an atmosphere conducive to Christian virtue. The variety of metaphors on the linguistic level does not convey a single and coherent concept but rather evokes a general impression that is illuminated from different angles (cf. metaphor type 2.1. above). It adds a material dimension to an abstract entity, wealth and poverty respectively, in order to make it more accessible and, as it were, tangible, and spotlight specific qualities that have gone unnoticed so far.

While Chrysostom’s kaleidoscope of spatial metaphors might appear ornamental, borrowing from the rhetorical excesses of sophistic orators, other passages suggest that
his spatial metaphors have a far-reaching effect on the audience in the context of ethical instruction. To consider them superficial embellishment on the rhetorical level would be a misleading assumption, because in many cases Chrysostom does develop the metaphors further and display a subtle technique. In a treatise that summons the addressee to abandon the pleasures of the worldly life and return to the monastic vocation Chrysostom makes numerous references to physical space and depicts vivid scenes taken from urban life. One didactic example of a young man from an affluent family uses spatial language to great effect as Chrysostom combines the literal and the metaphorical meaning of up and down (cf. orientational metaphors, type 1, above). When the lad, aptly called Phoenix, is speaking from above, on horseback, to saintly men who seek to win him back for the spiritual life, the relationship of up and down nicely visualizes the misguided pride and the perverted values of the protagonist. In fact, as the narrator comments, Phoenix has fallen from the religious life above into earthly concerns and is now deep in vice. However, ultimately, after his Phoenix-like fall and rise again, he enters the path upwards to heaven. Not only this brief narrative, but the entire treatise employs the orientational metaphor of up and down to highlight the need for renouncing the vainglory of the world and returning to the spiritual realm.

This evaluative hierarchy also features prominently in the final exhortation. After a brief quotation of the Biblical metaphor of the yoke of God, Chrysostom first introduces the spatial metaphor of agriculture. He asks his addressee to close up the streams of destruction, lest he suffer severe damage and the cultivated field be completely flooded. Only then will he make up for the loss and even add profit. After that, Chrysostom quickly switches to another scene and imagines the addressee as wrestling with a dangerous opponent. In an elaborate image he draws on the familiar metaphor of athletics and envisages the addressee as a wrestler who has been beaten by his competitor but can recover his firm stance and ward off the other’s blows, until, with the help of God, he succeeds and even saves other people with his virtue. At first, the two scenarios, the farmer and the wrestler, do not easily match, as they represent two widely different situations. However, both are united by the notion that a strenuous effort amid adverse conditions will result in success and profit, as long as the person concerned fixes their eyes on a clear goal. This lesson, which is also referred to at the beginning of the passage by talking about the noble yoke and the goal (telos), is represented, not by single linguistic metaphors, but by whole scenarios that evoke graphic images in the mind of the audience (cf. conceptual metaphors, type 2.2., above). Chrysostom furnishes the two spatial metaphors with just sufficient detail – characters, objects, actions and events – so that the audience can imagine how it feels to protect the crops from flood or fight an antagonist.

What is striking in passages like this is the role of the audience within the metaphorical scenarios. Instead of merely providing descriptions of spaces, Chrysostom integrates his addressee in the scenes imagined. Since the experience of the spatial dimension is deeply embedded in the human body, the Church Father wants his audience to become part of the metaphorical spaces, engage there, even though only in imagination, and develop a feeling for these environments. The intended result of this involvement of the audience in the textual space is that they adopt the perspective of the characters and re-enact their experiences. Consequently, they will develop an understanding of what needs to be done

69 The treatise is entitled Ad Theodorum lapsum, edited by Dumortier. On the questions of dating and addressee see the introduction in Dumortier.
70 Chrysostom, Ad Theodorum lapsum 1.18–9.
71 Cf. Mt 11:30.
72 For Chrysostom’s use of images and analogies from athletics see Koch, who is, however, rather interested in Chrysostom’s familiarity with sports. Sawhill has also a collection of passages where Chrysostom refers to the Christian agon.
or avoided if they want to achieve their aims. The close link that Chrysostom establishes between the bodily experience of imaginary spaces and human reasoning suggests that in his view the process of understanding can be enhanced by drawing on the body and the embodied memory. Chrysostom uses conceptual metaphors, which are based on familiar domains such as agriculture and athletics, and maps them onto the spiritual life, so that the audience views it in a different light. Since the spiritual life is a rather abstract concept, the spatial scenarios with their vividness fulfill a didactic purpose, enhancing the believer’s awareness of the duties and tasks required from a clergyman.

3.6 Augustine’s epistemology and spatial metaphors

When it comes to describing cognitive processes conveying a form of cognition which is regarded as the highest, pure, divine etc. knowledge, ancient philosophical and religious texts often resort to spatial metaphors and spatial conceptualizations. By means of these, they locate this process of cognizance ‘above’ the world which is perceptible through the senses or within an ‘inner part’ of the human being or of that person’s soul respectively (rarely in the head). Especially Platonists and in their wake also Platonizing Christians often speak of an ‘ascent’ into the ‘realm’ of the intelligible, of ‘stepping outside’ (ecstasy) of the body, of ‘stepping inside’ into the ‘innermost’ from which again a ‘transcending’ of the ‘uppermost’ part of the soul is supposed to be possible.

How a textual analysis guided by theoretical approaches to metaphor can be fruitfully employed for the comprehension of epistemological and theological concepts will be demonstrated by the example of Augustine’s (354–430 CE) work On the Trinity (De trinitate), which has increasingly become the subject of research into the ‘philosophy of mind’.

According to the philosopher Mark Johnson, space and container metaphors are formed even at a pre-linguistic stage on the basis of bodily experience and become ‘image schemata’ or patterns of perception. The body is experienced as a bounded space structured by the distinction between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ (which serve as orientational metaphors, type 1 above). According to the Platonic idea of man, which is at the basis of Augustine’s epistemology, the area which is, by means of the container metaphor, defined (and, in fact, excluded) as ‘outside’ contains the objects of perception. Material and corporeal bodies move in this space, and also the bodies of the perceivers. In contrast and as a complement, the area ‘inside’ encompasses everything which is immaterial and not perceptible to the senses. Immaterial and imperceptible are the mind or the soul, metaphorically speaking the ‘location’ in which processes of thought and cognition take place, where not only awareness, objects of knowledge, memory and recollection are ‘located’, but also truth per se, which is often, by means of another spatial, orientational metaphor, called the ‘highest’.

The primary focus of the second part of Augustine’s work De trinitate is the question of the relationship between man, who is according to Gen 1:27 ‘in God’s own likeness’ (imago dei), and the Maker, who has created the human ‘likeness.’ According to Augustine’s explanations, the imago dei is present ‘in’ the human mind; it is not a metaphor, but a kind of structure which does not represent God in a mimetic sense. For in his earthly, mortal body, man cannot see God ‘face-to-face’, but only, in agreement with the Pauline metaphor, as a ‘reflection in the mirror’ and ‘in an enigma.’ These refer to God through

73 Cf. e.g. Lakoff and Johnson 1999.
75 Johnson b1987, chapters 2 and 4.
76 1Cor 13:12.
their ‘likeness’ and man can ‘work’ on them by trying to free them from ‘obfuscations’.\textsuperscript{77} The human mind ‘carries’ God’s (real) image in itself and is thus not wholly ‘detached’\textsuperscript{78} from him, but man can only see him indirectly, or metaphorically: by means of a ‘dull mirror’.\textsuperscript{79} In addition, both the ‘place’ in which the \textit{imago dei} is located and the object of the \textit{imago} itself, i.e. God as destination of the \textit{itinerarium mentis}, are ineffable and inexpressible.\textsuperscript{80} In his teachings about the \textit{memoria} in book 10 of his \textit{Confessions}, Augustine speaks of an ‘inner non-location’\textsuperscript{81} or he denies the spatiality of the ‘place’\textsuperscript{82}. Spatial metaphors which are based on concrete bodily experience are still employed for the description of what is inexpressible in language, but they are negated. Thus the means of explanation of Augustine’s ‘negative theology’ are transformed into ‘negative metaphorical imagery’.

By locating the origin of mental images and conceptualizations – also of the concept of trinity – in the ‘exterior world’ perceptible to the senses, Augustine anticipates in some respects what has been called by Mark Johnson the \textit{body in the mind}.\textsuperscript{83} Thought is guided and structured by the recollection of bodily experience, and similarly the ‘thought space’ of the human mind is imagined and rendered imaginable through the concepts informed by sensory perception. Contrary to the theories of an embodied cognition (after the zoologist Jakob von Uexküll), no topology of the brain in which cognitive processes and functions are assigned to specific areas of the brain (as an organ): rather, the container metaphor and the associated bodily experience – to use Augustine’s terms: the concept of the ‘inner man’ – structure the abstract domain ‘mind/soul/thought/cognition’ and offer orientation for language and thought about this area of discourse.\textsuperscript{84} Augustine’s use of spatial imagery and the container metaphor in \textit{De trinitate} can best be described with recourse to the theory of conceptual blending (or conceptual integration) developed by Gilles Fauconnier and Mark Turner:\textsuperscript{85} as Augustine employs the notion of image both in a metaphorical (\textit{species et aenigma}) and a more concise sense (\textit{imago dei}), he creates an ‘interaction’\textsuperscript{86} between the scope of application and the metaphor (target domain and source domain), making them intermingle and integrate reciprocally. The target domain (thought) and the source domain (space) are not strictly separated, but act as equal suppliers towards a new conceptualization of cognitive processes: the human mind is metaphorically conceived of as ‘space of cognition’ which contains a non-metaphorical but not entirely perceptible reality (the image of God). From this conceptual blend emerges a mental space which can only be described with negative metaphors. It contains – metaphorically speaking – an ‘interface’ or a ‘point of contact’ where something which is entirely removed from all things imaginable is described by means of the concreteness of metaphor. The explicatory value of the spatial imagery obviously consists in the potential of space to render imaginable the opening into the infinite and the removal of three-dimensionality in infinity. Thus spatial metaphors serve as a kind of ‘tilting figure’ between spatial and concrete thought and the imagination of what is not perceptible to the senses.

\begin{itemize}
\item [77] Augustine, \textit{De trinitate} 14.6–20.
\item [78] So Horn \textsuperscript{2001} 112–115 against Brachtendorf \textsuperscript{2003}.
\item [79] Contrary to Horn \textsuperscript{2001}.
\item [80] Augustine, \textit{De trinitate} 15.13; 15.50.
\item [81] Augustine, \textit{Confessiones} 10.16: \textit{interior locus, non locus}.
\item [82] Augustine, \textit{Confessiones} 10.37: \textit{nusquam locus}.
\item [83] Johnson \textsuperscript{1987}.
\item [84] According to Lakoff and Johnson \textsuperscript{1983}.
\item [85] Fauconnier and Turner \textsuperscript{2002}.
\item [86] The use of the term ‘interaction’ follows the work of Black \textsuperscript{1962}.
\end{itemize}
3.7 Love, hunting, and spatial metaphor in medieval literature

Since antiquity love and desire have been linked to hunting,\(^{87}\) which can be understood as a spatial concept. The hunting actions – the source domain – presuppose movements in space, especially in the attempt to reduce the distance between hunter and prey. Thus the hunting metaphors, the comparisons and the hunting plots emphasize the spatial aspects of desire.

Wolfram von Eschenbach (c. 1170 – c. 1220) composed his Parzival between 1200 and 1210 as an adaptation of Chrétien de Troyes’ Perceval written between 1182 and 1191. In one episode the knight Gawan rides out in order to prove in a trial by combat that he is not responsible for the death of the king of Ascalun. On arrival, Gawan encounters the son of the late monarch, Vergulaht, who, failing to recognize the guest, sends him on to the castle. There, Gawan is received and entertained by Antikonie, Vergulaht’s sister. On the spur of the moment, Gawan and the princess engage in a love affair. Left alone with her, Gawan thinks to himself, “that a weak eagle often catches a big ostrich”, and he gropes under her cloak.\(^{88}\) This metaphor is not mentioned by Chrétien. The eagle does not belong to the noble birds and was usually not tamed by hunters.\(^{89}\) Gawan’s identification with the eagle may be due to his wild behavior as he gropes under the girl’s cloak. Besides, the ostrich, Gawan’s oversized prey, was known as an easy prey as it cannot fly.\(^{90}\) Gawan, therefore, can hardly be said to brace himself for a difficult task. The girl raises no objections, but unfortunately, the pair is discovered by a vassal, who accuses Gawan of rape.\(^{91}\) Subsequently, the lovers are assaulted by a mob of furious citizens, until a landgrave interrupts the fighting on the grounds that the guest is entitled to the protection of his host until the trial.

Meanwhile Vergulaht returns from an unsuccessful attempt to hunt an egret in the course of which he loses his horse and his clothes, which he has to leave to his falconers according to custom. While the young king fails in hunting with falcons, the guest identifies himself with an eagle and hunts the king’s sister.\(^{92}\) We know from medieval hunting treatises that falcons are afraid of eagles. This is why hunters were advised not to hunt with falcons when there were eagles close by.\(^{93}\) Thus, according to the narrative logic, the king’s falcons must fail, while the eagle Gawan catches his prey. In addition, while fighting against the angry citizens, Gawan manages to muster courage by admiring the maiden’s beauty, which is described as follows: “I doubt you ever saw a better-looking hare on a spit than she was there and here between the hip and her bosom”.\(^{94}\) Wolfram compares the princess to an animal often caught and devoured by eagles,\(^{95}\) prepared here, however, for digestion by the human stomach. The hunting theme occurs on different

---

\(^{87}\) Cf. Ovid, Ars amatoria.

\(^{88}\) Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 406,30-407,2: “[...] daz dicke den grôzen strûz / væhet ein vil kranker ar. / er greif ir undern mantel dar [...]”

\(^{89}\) The king of Ascalun has his flaws as well, as he does not master falconry which belonged by that time to the aristocratic ideal. See Schnell [1974], 249, and Kaiser Friedrich II. Über die Kunst mit Vögeln zu jagen, book 2, 176–181.

\(^{90}\) See Schnell [1974], 254-255.

\(^{91}\) In the French text, the young lady is accused of collaboration with the enemy. This difference may appear substantial to the modern reader, but for the medieval audience (who knew Ovid’s Ars amatoria or other works influenced by the ‘praeceptor amoris’), rape may have implied silent consent on the part of the girl.

\(^{92}\) See Schnell [1974], 258-260.


\(^{94}\) Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 409,26–29: “baz geschicht an spizze hasen, / ich wæne den gesâht ir nie, / dan si was dort unde hie, / zwischen der hüffe unde ir brust.” The translations of the Middle High German text by B. Trînca are based on the translation by Edwards.

\(^{95}\) See Kaiser Friedrich II. Über die Kunst mit Vögeln zu jagen, book 1, 36.
levels within the episode: in a metaphor, in a comparison, and as a plot element. This results in humorous, burlesque correspondences between the characters, and serves as an ironic commentary on the events of the plot. While the king fails, the stranger manages to reduce distance to his prey.

Wolfram does not only modify certain details and add others to Chrétien’s story, he also omits narrative elements. He does not recount, for example, Gauvain’s hunt for the white roe which escapes him before he reaches Escavalon (the French equivalent to Ascalun). Instead of becoming a successful hunter, Gauvain, it would seem, finds himself hunted. For his newfound “amie” refers to a member of the angry mob which attacks them as a “mad dog”. Gauvain’s erotic desire is interrupted by people who desire violence. The fact that dogs were often used in deer hunting would suggest that Gauvain is being identified here with the former game. He changes from hunter to prey. This all happens while the girl’s brother is out hunting with real dogs in the woods (not with falcons, as in the German version).

Chrétien’s reference to Gauvain’s pursuit of a doe probably refers to a text from the ‘lai’ tradition, the short anonymous narrative called Lay de Graalent. In this text, a fairy lures the knight she lusts after by sending a white roe, which he follows until he meets the beautiful woman. In other ‘lais’, the love story with a fairy follows an unsuccessful hunt. The wild animal apparently provokes or leads to erotic desire. In Chrétien’s text, the recompense for the lost roe is not a fairy but an attractive princess living in the country Escavalon, whose name resembles that of the fairy realm of Avalon. Yet the French poet disappoints his audience’s expectations, as the love story is a very short one, although Gauvain promises to be the girl’s knight for the rest of his life. Contrary to the destiny of the protagonists of the ‘lais’, Gauvain leaves his beloved a short time after their encounter. Wolfram gives up these allusions to the ‘lai’ tradition. At first glance, one might be tempted to attribute this to the absence of ‘lais’ in German literature, and conclude that Wolfram’s audience would not have understood the references. One would, however, be mistaken, for Wolfram only inserts them into another episode where Chrétien does not mention them.

After his reconciliation with the people of Ascalun, Gawan comes upon a wounded knight and rides in the direction from which he came. He follows a trail of blood; it is “as though a stag had been shot.” Chrétien does not use this comparison. Gawan reaches Logroys where he meets a beautiful woman, Orgeluse, beside a well, and he falls in love. Fairies often sojourn near wells, so Orgeluse takes their place in Wolfram’s romance (but not in Chrétien’s text, where the lady stands on a grassy plain). The hunting motif anticipates the encounter even though Gawan is not hunting on this occasion. As was already mentioned, Wolfram adopts the deer-hunting theme from his source, but not only does he insert it into another episode, he also contradicts his French precursor’s changes to the ‘lai’ tradition: Gawan marries the woman he meets this time, so that, after the hunting motif, a long-lasting relationship follows – just as in the ‘lais’, but contrary to Chrétien’s romance. However, Wolfram also contradicts the ‘lai’ tradition, as Orgeluse is at first unwilling to give her heart to Gawan, whereas the fairies are longing for love.

96 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5680: “bische”.
97 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5956: “chien esragié”.
98 See also Trînca 2008, 171-172.
99 Lay de Graalent v. 201: “bisse”.
100 See Baumgartner 2003, 26 and the ‘lais’; Guigemar (v. 79–122), Equitan (v. 46–60) by Marie de France, the anonymous Lay de Guingamor (v. 157–678), Lay de Tyolet (v. 346–351), Lay de Melîon (v. 71–86).
101 Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 5828–5829: “dist qu’il iert / Ses chevaliers toute sa vie.”
102 Wolfram von Eschenbach, Parzival v. 507,26: “als ein hirze ware erschozzen dâ.”
103 See Lay de Graulent v. 206–222, Lai de Desiré v. 141.
104 Cf. Chrétien de Troyes, Perceval v. 6676.
Wolfram’s knight has to experience many adventures before Orgeluse agrees to marry him.

Gawan’s trip to Ascalun and Logroys is littered with hunting motifs. As elements of the plot, metaphors, and comparisons they set up a macro-metaphor (cf. metaphor types 2.2 and 2.3), which describes love and illustrates the spatiality of desire.

3.8 Shakespeare’s use of metaphor in Coriolanus: theoretical aspects

Shakespeare’s (1564–1616) tragedy Coriolanus differs from many of his other plays in its distinctive metaphoricity. Not only do individual characters make use of a variety of specific metaphors as the occasion arises, but one overarching trope unfolds a structuring force for the drama as a whole: the trope of the human household. This macro-trope is, at times, articulated in an explicit manner by various speakers, but for the greater part of the drama it remains unspoken, tacitly but devastatingly effective in terms both of the plot and the interaction of its protagonists.

In theoretical terms, the use of the household metaphor in Coriolanus is therefore interesting in more than one way: Typologically, it is obviously a spatial metaphor, referring to the house or oikos and its management; also, to the limits of the house, the demarcation lines that separate outer from inner space and the manner in which these boundaries between interiority and exteriority are permeable or may be transgressed. Due to this semantic richness of its source domain, it is also an extremely versatile conceptual metaphor (cf. metaphor type 2.2. above). It is capable of conceptualizing the human soul, mapping the soul in its relationship to the body, the human unity of body and soul in its relation, indeed correspondence with, the world, the relationship between individuals within a larger aggregate such as a polis like Rome (or, for that matter, London). Finally, in connection with these traditional conceptual functions and the concomitant need to unfold them on a somewhat larger scale, it tends to occur as parable or, more often than not, as allegory, i.e. as metaphorica continua or extended metaphor, in the sense communicated to an early modern English audience by ancient rhetoric, especially by the Roman rhetorician Quintilian (c. 35 – c. 100 CE).

In all these respects, the household metaphor, in Shakespeare’s time, had become a topos, or commonplace. That is to say, it was highly conventional. As appears from the play itself, however, it was still amenable to, if not in need of, explication, or allegoresis. In fact, as the process of allegoresis staged within the play comes to reflect the nexus of allegory and allegoresis, its dramatic presentation assumes the structure of meta-allegory. The play itself turns into a critical comment on the very process of producing and reading an extended metaphor. Thus it grows into a comment on the facility with which metaphorical discourse may be instrumentalized and put to political use. Hence, and in the final analysis, Coriolanus may also be seen to perform the failure of metaphor. This needs to be explained.

To some extent, the literary effects of man’s household as a guiding metaphor in Coriolanus are linked with the various forms it assumes, their differing degrees of conventionality, complexity and ‘size’ Thus, for instance, the very conventionality of the household metaphor hides the fact – which is in turn rendered perceptible in the course of the drama – that ‘household’ and ‘economy’ are actually metaphors of each other. If, then, the economy of a city such as Rome or London is conceived as a household, power

105 All citations refer to the edition by Parker (act.scene.line). For a detailed reading of the play see Lobsien Lobsien.
106 Cf. Hes. op.; Aristot. pol. I, 1254b; Plat. Phaid. 79–84c.
107 Cf. Quintilian, Institutio oratoria, VIII 6, 44–53. Also cf. metaphor type 2.3. above.
relations, distribution of goods and values are placed in a certain light, familiarized in
domestic, indeed homely terms, rendered comprehensible, and justified in a way that
seems natural, therefore indisputable. This is what Menenius’ notorious Fable of the Belly
aims at in Shakespeare’s play. For it to function in the manner in which the speaker
intends it, its tropicallity must remain implicit, covered by its topicality.

In addition, the text employs different aesthetic strategies in presenting its central
metaphor. These range from open display – Menenius telling his Fable of the Belly in
order to calm the unrest seething amongst the hungry plebeians – to extended dramati-
zation in a performance that never explicitly uses words like ‘household’ or ‘economy’,
because it does not need to use them. At the same time, Shakespeare’s play undermines
the very notion of allegory as a didactic trope, hollowing out its parablic applicability
with respect to Elizabethan topical wisdom. This is also its major achievement: Coriolanus
demonstrates the hero’s ultimate failure in regulating his inner household, in realizing
Stoic oikeiōsis and indifference toward outer as well as inner affliction by pain and passion,
thus his tragic, paradoxical failure by way of doing precisely what he excels in and what
is deemed praiseworthy. Lastly, and with equally irritating effect, Coriolanus employs
strategies of reliteralization. This happens for instance when the hero’s family (his own
household) come to seek him out; it happened before with his spectacular move to exile
himself from the body politic by literally leaving it to ‘a world elsewhere’ 108; it happens
at the very end, when he falls prey to the inexorable ‘economic’ logic of retaliation, which
demands that treason be ‘paid’ by the traitor’s death.

All this is neither edifying nor does it conform to the contemporary ideological
orthodoxy of stoically founded Elizabethan romanitas. With respect to the functions served
by Shakespeare’s use of allegory in Coriolanus, these could be described as resulting from
a bi-directional critique, both in a structural and in a content-oriented, propositional
sense. Structurally speaking, in Shakespeare’s extended household metaphors, ‘source’
and ‘target domains’ seem to change places, so that their differences become blurred. The
‘system[s] of implications’ 109 they evoke interact in a manner that renders their points of
attachment oddly arbitrary. We are faced with allegories that are doubly pointed – towards
the reference of their apparent target and towards that of their source.

Thus, in Menenius’ Fable of the Belly, 110 the critical potential of the allegory is bent
towards its target and thereby directed against its area of reference: While it was intended
to justify the unequal distribution of wealth and the inequity of power in the polis, by
the way it is presented and due to the circumstances in which it is placed in the play it
soon comes to function as a critique of those very phenomena. Above all, it fails because
it is so well known. It can therefore only be perceived ironically, both by its immediate
audience on stage and by its recipients in front of the stage, as a transparent attempt at
persuasion in the interests of the speaker’s own political party. Hence the plebeian hearers
repeatedly puncture the all-too-familiar ‘tale’ 111 by their sarcastic comments; hence the
speaker, too, responds in kind, inviting them to look at it in a jocular light, employing
humoristic body language or synecdochically addressing one of the hecklers as ‘the great
toe of this assembly’ 112 thus trying to deflate aggression. However, the overall effect is
that the very conventionality of the parable is put on display and ridiculed. Worse, via
the dysfunctionalty of the trope, the polis itself becomes the target of criticism. The
organological magic simply does not work. As a body, the City is divided against itself. It
turns against itself through the very medium of its central unifying metaphor.

108 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 3.3.136.
110 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.86–152.
111 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.87.
112 Shakespeare, Coriolanus 1.1.152.
Conversely, and with respect to the acting out of the extended household trope in the fate of the hero, the functional direction is inverted. In its very performance, criticism comes to be leveled against the source of this syndrome of figurative language. Now the household model itself, the reference of the signifying level of the allegory, is challenged, as Coriolanus, the perfect Stoic soldier, fails precisely because of his exceptional qualities. His ostentatious self-appropriation, his almost desperate striving for self-sufficiency, with martial virtue its own and sole reward, his remarkable imperviousness to pain and fear all represent and evoke Stoic concepts – *oikeiōsis* conceived as the ideal economy of body and soul in *apatheia* and self-control. While these were propagated in Elizabethan schools and society in order to inculcate the ideology of *romanitas*, they are here demonstrated to be tragically dysfunctional. With them, the household allegory becomes questionable.

The critical charge rests within the underlying extended spatial trope. In the end, the allegory becomes dubious *qua* allegory. It loses its signifying power both in the marketplace and elsewhere. As Coriolanus fails to govern his internal household; as the economy of political forces within the City, too, is shown to be fatally out of kilter, the Stoical concepts are equally shown to fail – as instruments of masculinist education towards heroic individualism, as enforcements of political discipline and subservience, as legitimations of inequity, and ultimately also as explicatory and persuasive metaphors purporting to transport ancient ‘economic’ ideology.

Shakespeare’s play, in systematically divesting the trope of man’s household of its functionality, self-evidence and applicability, makes a general point about metaphor. It seems to be saying that some sources (‘household’) may become too trite and too manipulable to be of use in explaining or altering complex realities (‘Rome’); also, that some targets (‘individual subjectivity’) are, perhaps, not amenable to this type of metaphorization. This kind of critique is the prerogative of literature, although the cognitive effects it is capable of producing certainly reach beyond the literary: they demonstrate the conceptual potential of the aesthetic.

4 Conclusions and perspectives

The proposed theoretical framework for classifying spatial metaphors shows that the metaphorical use of spaces and spatiality can occur to a varying extent and on all levels of literary discourse. The case studies further illustrate the scope and potential of the analysis of spatial metaphors through a number of genres and languages, ranging from wisdom texts and philosophical treatises to tragedy, and from Ancient Egyptian to Shakespearean English (thus spanning almost 3000 years of human thought and language). In a general sense, they substantiate the initial claim that spatial metaphors are a universal principle of human cognition. Somewhat more specifically, they show that the practice of attributing specific spatial relations to non-spatial or less clearly structured spatial concepts is in tune with the general tendency of the human mind to employ metaphorical thinking and phrasing when coping with abstract and ‘difficult’ concepts. Thus, writers of all times could avail themselves of spatial metaphors when attempting to describe, and make sense of, such complex domains as life and life choices (case studies 1, 3, 5), social institutions and interactions (case study 2), religious belief and doctrine (case studies 3, 4, 5, 6), cognition (case study 6), love (case study 7), or political as well as psychological structures (case study 8). The resulting metaphors are complex and frequently influential, developing a momentum and occasionally a history of their own. In some cases, especially when it seems difficult or even impossible to express a concept literally and recourse to metaphorical language is unavoidable, source and target domain may ultimately become

intertwined to such an extent that the distinction between literal and metaphorical thought and expression becomes blurred.

Thus, the examples chosen by the researchers of Topoi Group C-2 also vividly demonstrate the limits of attempting to generalize about form and usage of spatial metaphors in the light of the impressive diversity of actual, everyday as well as technical or literary metaphors.

In conclusion, it may also be worthwhile to reflect that, while theories of metaphor carry their value in themselves as media of insight and instruments of orientation, they will not serve as methods of analysis to be proved or exemplified by individual texts. Rather than applying pre-existing conceptions of metaphor and trying to fit its materials into theoretical straightjackets, philological practice will therefore, in its attempts to understand and interpret metaphors where they occur, do best closely to consider their respective functional and compositional contexts and permit the particular instance to challenge the general notion.
Spatial Metaphors of the Ancient World: Theory and Practice

References

Ameringer 1921

Baumgartner 2003

Black 1962

Boardman 2001

Brachtendorf 2000

Catoni 2010

Crisp et al. 2007

Dumortier 1966

Eggs 2001

Fauconnier and Turner 2002

Fuchs 2010

Gibbs 1996
Hanks 2006

Hobden 2013

Horn 2001

Johnson 1987

Kertsch 1995

Koch 2007

Kövecses 2010

Lagouanère 2012

Lakoff 1993

Lakoff and Johnson 1980

Lakoff and Johnson 1999

Lakoff and Turner 1989

Lissarrague 1987
Lissarrague 1990

Lobsien 2016

Luke 1994

Mahon 1999

Müller 2008

Murray 1990

Murray 2009

Murray and Tecuşan 1995

Musolff 2006

Parker 1994

Retzleff 2003

Richards 1936

Rossi 1983
Sawhill 1928

Schäfer 1971

Schklowski 1997

Schlesier 2016

Schlesier 1986–1987

Schnell 1974

Semino 2008

Stanford 1936

Steen 2008

Steen 2011

Steen et al. 2010

Stern 2000

Trînca 2008
Wilken 1983

Illustration credits

[© Antikensammlung, Staatliche Museen zu Berlin – Preußischer Kulturbesitz, F 3186. Photo: Johannes Laurentius.]
Fabian Horn
Dr. phil (München 2013), was a Postdoctoral Research Fellow of the Topoi research group C-2: *Space and Metaphor in Cognition, Language, and Texts* in 2013/2014. He currently works at the Department of Classics at the University of Munich. His research interests are theories of metaphor and their application to Archaic and Classical Greek literature, with particular focus on the Homeric poems.

Dr. Fabian Horn
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Abteilung für Griechische und Lateinische Philologie
Schellingstraße 3 (VG)
80799 München, Germany
E-Mail: Fabian.Horn@klassphil.uni-muenchen.de

Cilliers Breytenbach
Dr. theol. (Munich 1983), Dr. theol. habil (Munich 1986) is a professor of New Testament Studies at Humboldt University in Berlin and professor of classics at Stellenbosch University. He is the author of several monographs, including *Grace, Reconciliation, Concord. The Death of Christ in Graeco-Roman Metaphors* (Leiden 2010). Currently he heads a research program on the Expansion of Early Christianity in Asia Minor and Greece.

Prof. Dr. Cilliers Breytenbach
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Theologische Fakultät
Unter den Linden 6
10117 Berlin, Germany
E-Mail: cilliers.breytenbach@cms.hu-berlin.de

Camilla Di Biase-Dyson
Dr. phil. (Sydney 2009), is a Junior Professor of Egyptology at Georg-August-Universität in Göttingen. The primary focus of her research is the intersection between linguistics and literary theory, which includes investigations of text and sentence structure as well as the analysis of metaphor and other rhetorical structures. Other interests include translation studies, cognitive science and most recently the role of digital humanities in corpus-based studies of ancient languages.

Jun.-Prof. Camilla Di Biase-Dyson
Georg-August-Universität Göttingen
Seminar für Ägyptologie und Koptologie
Heinrich-Düker-Weg 14
37073 Göttingen, Germany
E-Mail: cdibias@uni-goettingen.de

Markus Egg
Dr. phil. (Konstanz 1993), Habilitation (Saarbrücken 2001), is a professor of English at Humboldt University in Berlin. His main focus is on semantics and its interface with syntax and pragmatics, where he is equally involved in developing the theoretical basis and in implementing it by the use of computer linguistics. An additional field of interest is the linguistic analysis of literary texts.
Prof. Dr. Markus Egg
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik
Unter den Linden 6
10117 Berlin, Germany
E-Mail: markus.egg@anglistik.hu-berlin.de

Therese Fuhrer
Dr. phil. (Berne 1989), Habilitation (Berne 1995), has held Chairs of Latin at the Universities of Trier, Zurich, Freiburg, the Free University of Berlin, and since 2013 at the LMU Munich. She is the author and editor of several books and has published a number of papers and book chapters on topics ranging from early and Hellenistic Greek poetry, republican and Augustan poetry and prose to Augustine. She is currently engaged in a number of major research projects in the field of Latin poetry, Roman rhetoric, and Late Antiquity.

Prof. Dr. Therese Fuhrer
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
Abteilung für Griechische und Lateinische Philologie
Geschwister-Scholl-Platz 1
80539 München, Germany
E-Mail: therese.fuhrer@klassphil.uni-muenchen.de

Verena Olejniczak Lobsien
Dr. phil. (1984 Hannover), Habilitation (1992 Frankfurt/Main) is Professor of English and Comparative Literature at the Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Her major research interests are Early Modern English literature and culture with a focus on transformations of antiquity. She is the author of *Subjektivität als Dialog* (München 1994), *Skeptische Phantasie* (München 1999); *Transparency and Dissimulation* (Berlin 2010); *Jenseitsästhetik* (Berlin 2012); *Shakespeares Exzess* (Wiesbaden 2015) and, with Eckhard Lobsien, co-author of *Die unsichtbare Imagination* (München 2003).

Prof. Dr. Verena Lobsien
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
Institut für Anglistik und Amerikanistik
Unter den Linden 6
10099 Berlin, Germany
E-Mail: verena.lobsien@rz.hu-berlin.de

Renate Schlesier
Dr. phil. (Berlin 1980), Habilitation (Berlin 1988), was a Professor of the Study of Culture and Anthropology at the University of Paderborn from 1993 to 2002 and is a Professor of the Study of Religion at the Free University of Berlin since 2002. She has been a visiting professor in France, the U.K., Israel, Italy, Japan, Canada, Switzerland and the USA. Her main field of research is ancient Greek religion in the context of cultural and intellectual history, including the history of transformation and interpretation of ancient concepts and figures down to the present. This focus of her interest is documented in numerous articles and books as well in her involvement in several collaborative research groups.
Jan R. Stenger
Dr. phil. (Kiel 2003), Habilitation (Kiel 2008), is the MacDowell Professor of Greek at the University of Glasgow. His research interests include Greek lyric poetry and late antiquity. The focus of his research into late antiquity is the pagan-Christian debate on the role of education in the fourth to sixth centuries.

Professor Jan R. Stenger
University of Glasgow
Classics, School of Humanities
UK Glasgow G12 8QQ
E-Mail: jan.stenger@glasgow.ac.uk

Beatrice Trînca
Dr. phil. (Würzburg 2007), is Junior Professor at the Freie Universität Berlin. Her research focuses on medieval and early modern literature, mysticism, aesthetics of religion, gender studies, reception of the Middle Ages.

Jun.-Prof. Dr. Beatrice Trînca
Freie Universität Berlin
Institut für Religionswissenschaft
Fabeckstraße 23–25, Raum 0.2006
14195 Berlin, Germany
E-Mail: beatrice.trinca@fu-berlin.de